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RAPE, RACISM, AND THE LAW 
JENNIFER WRIGGINS* 
INTRODUCTION t:~ 
The history of rape in this country has focused on the rape of white 
women by Black men. From a feminist perspective, two of the most 
damaging consequences of this selectiv~ blindness are the denials that 
Black women are raped and that all women are subject to pervasive 
and harmful sexual coercion of all kinds. 
This Note examines the historical legacy of the racist social mean­
ing of rape and its consequences. Part I describes the history of the 
legal and societal focus on punishing Black men when the rape of 
white women is claimed. Part II discusses the denial of the rape of 
Black women. Part III argues that the narrow focus on one racial 
combination of rape obscures the significance of the sexual coercion 
•student, Harvard Law School. 
Acknowledgments. Dozens of people contributed to the making of this Note, and the author 
is indebted to each of them. Among those who helped in ways the author especially appreciates 
are: Nia Burnette, Lisa Biow, George Chauncey, Jr., Rhonda Copelon, Christopher Edley, 
Jr., Karen A. Getman, Geraldine Hines, Muhammed Kenyatta, Mary Ann Kopydlowski, 
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Judy Miles, Stephanie Y. Moore, Lori J. Nelson, Lynn Paltrow, 
Jane Schacter, Robin Wiener, and Mary Whisner. Without their support, advice, and criticisms, 
this Note could not have been written. Special thanks are due to Mary Ellen Roy for her patient 
editing. Responsibility for the views expressed herein lies with the author. 
The word "Black" is capitalized in this Note when used to denote someone's race. The reason 
for this has been well stated by Catharine MacKinnon: 
Black is conventionally (I am told} regarded as a color rather than a racial or national 
designation, hence is not usually capitalized. I do not regard Black as merely a color 
of skin pigmentation, but as a heritage, an experience, a cultural and personal identity, 
the meaning of which becomes specifically stigmatic and/ or glorious and/ or ordinary 
under specific social conditions. It is as much socially created as, and at least in the 
American context no less specifically meaningful or definitive than, any linguistic, tribal, 
or religious ethnicity, all of which are conventionally recognized by capitalization. 
MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An Agenda for Theory, 7 SIGNS 
515, 516 (1982}. While a parallel argument could support the capitalization of "white," such 
a usage would resonate with a long tradition of dominance by whites and is hence rejected. 
103 
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all women face. Part IV argues that feminists must go beyond tradi­
tional rape reform measures to stop sexual coercion. 
PART I: THE NARROW FOCUS ON 
BLACK OFFENDER/WHITE VICTIM RAPE 
There are many different kinds of rape. 1 Its victims2 are of all 
races, 3 and its perpetrators are of all races. 4 Yet the kind of rape 
1 By "rape" this Note refers not to the legal definition of rape or sexualqssault, but rather 
to "any attempted or completed sexual act that is forced on an individual against his or her 
will." Bowker, Rape and Other Sexual Assaults, WoMEN AND CluME IN AMERICA 180, 180 
(L. Bowker ed. 1981). The term thus includes a wide range of situations, from a stranger 
assaulting a woman in a dark alley to a husband forcing sex on his wife, regardless of whether 
penetration is involved or the act is illegal. The term "illegal rape" refers to situations where 
the imposition of sex is prohibited by law. 
This Note addresses only the rape of women by men. Besides being the most prevalent and 
widely-studied kind of rape, it is also an important manifestation of, and means of perpetuating, 
male dominance. This Note argues that the treatment of this kind of rape by the legal system 
also serves as a weapon of white dominance. 
2 Rape statistics are notoriously unreliable. An initial problem with them is that they report 
only activity which the law defines as rape. Illegal rape is not necessarily the only or most 
harmful sex forced on victims. See MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: 
Toward Feminist Jurisprudence 8 SIGNS (forthcoming 1983); Comment, Rape and Rape Laws: 
Sexism in Society and Law, 61 CAL. L. REv. 919, 941 (1973). 
A second major problem with rape statistics is that underreporting even of illegal rape renders 
them inaccurate. It is likely that Black women underreport more than white women, espe· 
cially if the woman's assailant is white. See infra note 122. A recent estimate is that only one 
in two illegal rapes is reported. Bowker, Women as Victims: An Examination of the Results 
of L.E.A.A. ~National Crime Survey Program, in WOMEN AND CluME IN AMERICA, supra 
note 1, at 158-64. 
A third problem is that police often decide not to pursue rape complaints which may be 
valid, especially if the complainant is Black, so these complaints may not appear in police 
"reported rape" figures. Chappell, Geis, Schafer & Siegel, A Comparative Study of Forcible 
Rape Offenses Known to the Police in Boston and Los Angeles, in FoRCIBLE RAPE 227, 235 
(D. Chappell, R. Geis & G. Geis eds. 1977). 
More accurate figures may be derived from victim surveys which involve interviewing a 
random sample of citizens in a particular area concerning their victimization. It is from such 
surveys that the estimated ratios of actual to reported rapes are derived. However, this method 
has in some circumstances been found to underestimate the crime committed against Blacks. 
Hood & Sparks, Citizens Attitudes and Police Practice in Reporting Offenses, in VJCTIMOLOGY 
167 (1. Drapkin & E. Viano eds. 1974). 
3 This Note focuses on rape between white and Black people in this country. It does not 
deal with rape involving other people of color for several reasons. First, most of what has 
been written about race and rape focuses exclusively on Black/white issues. (Exceptions include 
J. WILLI.AMS & K. HoLMES, THE SECOND AssAULT (1981) [hereinafter cited as THE SECOND 
AssAULT]; AEGIS, March-Apr. 1979 (special issue entitled Violence Against Women and Race); 
Chu & Torres, Rape: It Can't Happen to Me!, BRIDGE: AN AsiAN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE, 
Spring 1979.) Second, critics of feminist rape literature have primarily addressed its failure 
to combat the myth of the Black rapist and to recognize the differences between the vulnerability 
of white and Black women as rape victims. See infra note 183. This Note attempts to begin 
to correct these failures. A remaining failure is commentators' neglect of rape as it affects 
other people of color. 
4 See infra text accompanying notes 121-232. 
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that has been treated most seriously throughout this nation's history 
has been the illegal forcible rape of a white woman by a Black 
man.5 The selective acknowledgement of Black accused/white 
victim rape was especially pronounced during slavery and through 
the first half of the twentieth century. 6 Today a powerful legacy 
remains that permeates thought about rape and race. 7 
Slavery 
During the slavery period, statutes in many jurisdictions provided 
the death penalty or castration for rape when the convicted man was 
Black or mulatto and the victim white. 8 These extremely harsh 
penalties were frequently imposed.9 In addition, mobs occasionally 
broke into jails and courtrooms and lynched slaves alleged to have 
raped white women, 10 prefiguring Reconstruction mob behavior .11 
In contrast to the harsh penalties imposed on Black offenders, 
courts occasionally released a defendant accused of raping a white 
woman when the evidence was inconclusive as to whether he was 
5 See Mann & Selva, The Sexualization of Racism: The Black as Rapist and White Justice, 
3 W. J. BLAcK STUDIES 168 (1979); see also infra text accompanying notes 8-80. 
6 See infra text accompanying notes 8-63. 
7 See infra text accompanying notes 64-80. 
8 See, e.g., Alabama Code of 1852 (death penalty for rape of a white woman by a slave 
or free Black); Mississippi 1857 Statute (death penalty for attempted carnal connection with 
or rape of a white female under fourteen by a slave); Tennessee 1858 Law (death by hanging 
for rape of a free white woman by a slave or free Black); Missouri 1825 Statute (castration 
for rape or attempted rape by a Black or mulatto); Arkansas Code of 1838 (death penalty 
for assault with intent to commit rape by a Black or mulatto). Bienen, Rape III-National 
Developments in Rape Reform Legislation, 6 WoMEN's RIGHTS L. REP. 170, 173 n.14 (1980). 
Although the last two states appear to provide strong sanctions for the rape of a Black woman 
by a Black man, the case law demonstrates that the claims of Black women were ignored. 
See infra text accompanying notes 93-96. Although concentrated in the South, statutes 
distinguishing between the races for sexual crimes were enacted in other states as well. See, 
e.g., Pennsylvania Code of 1700 (death penalty for rape of a white woman by a Black man); 
Kansas Compilation of 1855 (castration at his own expense for rape or attempted rape of 
a white woman by a Black or mulatto). Bienen, supra, at 173-n.14; see also Bums, Race 
Discrimination-Law and Race in America, in THE PoLITics oF LAw 89 (D. Kairys ed. 1982). 
9 Dennis, a slave, v. State, 5 Ark. 230 (1843); State v. Joshua, a slave, 15 La. Ann. 118 
(1860); State v. Bill, 8 Rob. 527 (La. 1844); Isham v. State, 33 Tenn. (1 Sneed) Ill (1853); 
EIIick v. State, 31 Tenn. (1 Swan) 325 (1851); Commonwealth v. Watts (4 Leigh) 672 (1833); 
Thompson v. Commonwealth, 31 Va. (4 Leigh) 652 (1833). 1-3 JUDICIAL CASES CoNCERNING 
AME!uCAN SLAVERY AND THE NEGRO (H. Catterall ed. 1926-1932); seeM. HINDUS, PRISON 
AND PLANTATION! CRiME, JUSTICE AND AUTHORITY IN MAssACHUSETTS AND SOUTH CAROLINA 
1767-1878, at 150-61 (198.0); K. STAMPP, THE PEcULIAR INSTITUTION 210-11 (1956). 
1° K. STAMPP, supra note 9, at 190-91. 
11 See infra text accompanying notes 26-40. 
HeinOnline -- 6 Harv. Women’s L. J.  105 1983
106 Harvard Women's Law Journal [Vol. 6 
Black or mulatto. 12 The rape of Black women by white or Black 
men, on the other hand, was legal; 13 indictments were sometimes 
dismissed for failing to allege that the victim was white. 14 In those 
states where it was illegal for white men to rape white women, statutes 
provided less severe penalties for the convicted white rapist than for 
the convicted Black one. 15 In addition, common-law rules both 
defined rape narrowly16 and made it a difficult crime to prove. 17 
During slavery, then, the legal system treated seriously only one 
racial combination of rape-rape involving a Black offender and a 
white victim. This selective recognition continued long after slavery 
ended. 
The Post-Civil War Period 
After the Civil War, state legislatures made their rape statutes race­
neutral, 18 but the legal system treated rape in much the same way 
12 Thurman v. State, 18 Ala. 276 (1850); Dick, a slave, v. State, 30 Miss. 631 (1856). 
13 S. BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL)76 (1975); Evans, Rape, Race, and Research, in 
BLACKS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 75, 79 (C. Owens & J. Bell eds. 1977); see \V. BOWERS, 
ExECUTIONS IN AMERICA 173 (1974); A. L. HIGGINBOTHAM, IN nm MATTER OF CoLOR 282 (1978); 
Blackwell, Social and Legal Dimensions of Interracial Liaisons, in THE BLACK MALE IN AMERICA 
219, 225 (D. Wilkinson & R. Taylor eds. 1977) [hereinafter cited as THE BLACK MALE); infra 
notes 89-96 and accompanying text. 
14 State v. Charles, a slave, I Fla. 298 (1847); Commonwealth v. Jerry Mann, 4 Va. (Va. 
Cas.) 210 (1820); George, a slave, v. State, 37 Miss. 316 (1859); see infra text accompanying 
notes 93-96. 
15 See, e.g., Virginia Code of 1819 and 1823 Law (death penalty for rape or attempted rape 
of a white woman by a slave, Black, or mulatto and term of I 0-21 years for rape by a white 
man); Kentucky 1802 Code (death penalty for rape of a white woman by a slave and term 
of years for rape by a white man). Bienen, supra note 8, at 173 n.14; Georgia Penal Code 
of 1816 (death penalty for rape or attempted rape of a free white woman by a slave or free 
person of color and term of not more than 20 years for rape or attempted rape by a white 
man) No. 380 §§ 33-34; No. 508 and 509, § 2; Georgia Acts of 1816 § I, CoMPILATION OF 
THE LAws OF GEORGIA 804 (Lamar ed. 1821), cited in Amicus Brief of Women's Legal Defense 
Fund and Equal Rights Advocates at 17, Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977). 
16 For example, rape by one's husband and rape not involving penetration by the penis were 
not defmed as "rape." See H. FEILD & L. BIENEN, JURORS AND RAPE 154, 163 (1980) [hereinafter 
cited as JURORS); MAcKINNoN, Violence Against Women: A Perspective, AEms, Jan. 1982 
51, 53; MacKinnon, supra note 2; Comment, supra note 2, at 925-26. 
17 The two most important rules were those allowing admission of evidence of the sexual 
history of the victim and requiring extensive corroborating evidence of the rape. Berger, Man's 
Trial, Woman's Tribulation, 77 CoLUM, L. REv. 1, 15-20 (1977); Note, The Victim in a Forcible 
Rape Case: A Feminist View, 11 AM. CRn.1. L. REV. 335, 336 (1973); Comment, supra note 
2, at 919; see infra text accompanying notes 140-163. Such rules were relaxed when the defendant 
was Black. See infra text accompanying notes 145-151. 
18 A compilation of all post-Civil War state legislation enacted prior to 1917 that mentioned 
race contained no rape statutes. F. JOHNSON, THE DEVELOPMENT OF STATE LEGISLATION CON· 
CERNING THE FREE NEGRO (1918). Such race-specific legislation included many anti-
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as it had before the war. Black women raped by white or Black men 
had no hope of recourse through the legal system.19 White women 
raped by white men faced traditional common-law barriers that pro­
tected most rapists from prosecution.20 
Allegations of rape involving Black offenders and white victims 
were treated with heightened virulence. This was manifested in two 
ways. The first response was lynching, which peaked near the end 
of the nineteenth century. 21 The second, from the early twentieth 
century on, was the use of the legal system as a functional equivalent 
of lynching, as illustrated by mob coercion of judicial 
proceedings,22 sp.ecial doctrinal rules,23 the language of opinions,24 
and the markedly disparate numbers of executions for rape between 
white and Black defendants.25 
Lynching 
Between 1882 and 1946 at least 4715 persons were lynched, about 
three-quarters of whom were Black. 26 Although lynching tapered 
off after the early 1950s, occasional lynch-like killings persist to this 
day. 27 The influence of lynching extended far beyond the numbers 
miscegenation statutes. Id. at 8-10, 62-207. These statutes, providing criminal penalties for 
interracial marriage, were declared unconstitutional only quite recently, in Loving v. Virginia, 
388 U.S. 1 (1967}, and McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964). 
For thorough general discussions of miscegenation see D. BELL, RACE, RAciSM AND AMERicAN 
LAw 53-81 (1980); Applebaum, Miscegenation Statutes: A Constitutional and Social Pro­
blem, 53 GEo. L.J. 49 (1964). For a more specific historical discussion, see J. JoHNSTON, RAcE 
RELATIONS IN VIRGINIA AND ¥ISCEGENATION IN THE SOUTH 1776-186o (1970). 
19 See infra text accompanying notes 101-112. 
20 See supra note 16. 
21 A. RAPER, THE TRAGEDY OF LYNCHING 1-2 (1933); C. WOODWARD, THE STRANGE 
CAREER OF JIM CRow 43 (1974); Note, Constitutionality of Proposed Federal Anti-Lynching 
Legislation, 34 VA. L. REv. 944 (1948). 
22 See infra text accompanying notes 37-50. 
23 See infra text accompanying notes 51-55. 
24 See infra text accompanying notes 56-58. 
l3 See infra text accompanying notes 59-63. 
26 A. RoSE, THE NEGRO IN AMERICA 185 (1948) (citing a Tuskegee Institute study). A study 
by the NAACP found the number of lynchings acknowledged by white officials between 1882 
and 1927 to be 4951, with approximately 700Jo of the victims being Black. White, A State­
ment of Fact [on Lynching], in A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE NEGRO PEOPLE IN THE UNrrED 
STATES 19Io-1932, at 610 (H. Aptheker ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as DocmmNTARY HISTORY]. 
27 In March 1981, in Mobile, Alabama, a 19-year-old Black man was beaten, strangled to 
death, and left hanging from a tree by a rope tied in a noose. N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 1981, 
at A12, col. 6. There were suggestions by people in the community that he was killed for socializ­
ing with white women, or that he was mistaken for a Black co-worker who was married to 
a white woman. Id., Mar. 26, 1981, at Al6, col. 6. Three white men were arrested for the 
murder but later released when a grand jury failed to return indictments. Id., July 28, 1981, 
at A12, col. 6. 
HeinOnline -- 6 Harv. Women’s L. J.  107 1983
108 Harvard Women's Law Journal [Vol. 6 
of Black peoplelB murdered because accounts of massive white 
crowds torturing, burning alive, and dismembering their victims29 
created a widespread sense of terror in the Black community.30 
The most common justification for lynching was the claim that 
a Black man had raped a white woman. 31 The thought of this par­
ticular crime aroused in many white people an extremely high level 
of mania and panic. One white woman, the wife of an 
ex-Congressman, stated in 1898, "If it needs lynching to protect 
woman's dearest possession from human beasts, then I say lynch a 
thousand times a week if necessary .'732 The quote resonates with 
common stereotypes that Black male sexuality is wanton and 
bestial/3 and that Black men are wild, criminaP4 rapists of white 
women.35 
28 Black women were not spared the violence of lynchings. The NAACP study, discussed 
in White, supra note 26, found that of the 4951 people lynched, 76 were Black women. /d. 
at 610. Vivid first person accounts of the lynchings of Black women document that no gentleness 
was accorded them on account of their sex. See G. LERNER, BLACK WoMEN IN WHITE AMERICA 
161-63 (1972); Katz, The Negro Woman and the Law, in 2 FREEDOMWAYS 289 (1962); DocUMEN· 
TARY HISTORY, supra note 26, at 142. 
29 See A. RAPER, supra note 21, at 141-44, 420-21; I. WELLS, Lynching Bee, in A RED 
REcoRD: LYNCHINGS IN TilE UNITED STATES 1892-1893·1894 (1895), reprinted in JUSTICE DENIED: 
THE BLACK MAN IN WHITE AMERICA 196 (W. Chace & P. Collier eds. 1970). 
30 A. RosE, supra note 26, at 186-87; Hall, ''The Mind that Bums in Each Body": Women, 
Rape, and Racial Violence, in PoWERS OF DESIRE: THE Pouncs oF SEXUALITY (A. Snitow, 
C. Stansell & S. Thompson eds. forthcoming 1983); Hernton, The Negro Male, in THE BLACK 
MALE, supra note 13, at 244-46. 
31 A. RoSE, supra note·26, at 185; C. WooDWARD, supra note 21, at 43; Hall, supra note 
30; Reynolds, The Remedy for Lynch Law, 7 YALE L.J. 20, 20 (1897-98) (quoting an article 
that refers to the lynching of a Black man for the alleged rape of a white woman as "the usual 
crime"}. 
32 Reynolds, supra note 31, at 20. 
33 Day, The Hidden Fear, in THE BLACK MALE, supra note 13, at 193, 197-98. The assump­
tion made by whites that Blacks have bestial sexuality has deep historical roots. See W. JoRDAN, 
WHITE OVER BLACK: AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD TilE NEGRO 1550-I812, at 32-40, 151 
(1968). In a culture with a somatophobic heritage such as ours, the association of any group 
with physicality or sexuality is in itself degrading. For discussions of this phenomenon as it 
relates to women, seeS. DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX 182-84 (1952); S. GRIFFIN, WOMEN 
AND NATURE (1978); Ortner, Is Female to Male as Nature is to Culture?, in WoMAN, CULTURE 
AND SociETY 67 (M. Rosaldo & L. Lamphere eds. 1974); Spelman, Woman as Body: Ancient 
and Contemporary Views, 8 FEMINIST STUDIES 109, 119 (1982). 
34 The association of Black men with criminality extends back at least to the nineteenth cen­
tury. A. RosE, supra note 26, at 303. White criminals often capitalized on and perpetuated 
this stereotype by dying their faces black before committing crimes. /d. at 304; Johnson, The­
Negro and Crime, in THE SociOLOGY OF CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 419, 422 (M. Wolfgang, 
L. Santz & N. Johnston eds. 2d ed. 1970). The alleged propensity of Black men to rape white 
women can be seen partly as a manifestation of the criminality stereotype. In 1933, Arthur 
Raper made this link in trying to explain lynching: "[A]ccording to the popular estimate, all 
Negroes are essentially alike and are inclined to commit certain crimes, chief of which is the 
rape of white women." A. RAPER, supra note 21, at 50; see A. RosE, supra note 26, at 305. 
Note that "all Negroes" refers only to Black men; Black women are left out of this formulation. 
35 In the United States the myth of Black male sexuality includes the .characterization of 
the Black male as rapist of white women. See, e.g., E. GENOVESE, Rou JoP.DAN Rou: THE 
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Many whites accepted lynching as an appropriate punishment for 
a Black man accused of raping a white woman. The following argu­
ment made to the jury by defense counsel in a 1907 Louisiana case 
illustrates this acceptance: 
Gentlemen of the jury, this man, a nigger, is charged with 
breaking into the house of a white man in the nighttime and 
assaulting his wife, with the intent to rape her. Now, don't you 
know that, if this nigger had committed such a crime, he never 
would have been brought here and tried; that he would have 
been lynched, and if I were there I would help pull on the 
rope.36 
The Legal System's Treatment: "Legal Lynching" 
It is doubtful whether the legal system better protected the rights 
of a Black man accused of raping a white woman than did the 
mob.37 Contemporary legal literature used the term ''legal lynching" 
WoRLD THE SLAVEs MADE 336 (1976); G. LERNER, supra note 28, at 193; Mann & Selva, supra 
note 5, at 169-70; Schmidt, Principle and Prejudice: The Supreme Court and Race in the 
Progressive Era. Part 1: The Heyday of Jim Crow, 82 CoLUM. L. REv. 3, 444, 454 (1982). 
36 State v. Petit, 119 La. 1013, 1016, 44 So. 848, 849 (1907) (quoting defense counsel). The 
argument also reveals much about the way the legal system defined the rape of white women. 
The house where the alleged rape took place belonged not to the victim but to "a white man" 
and she was "his wife." A Black woman would not have received such protection from the 
legal system and a white woman did only because she belonged to a white man. These dynamics 
are discussed infra text accompanying notes 143-166. Also, note that the jury here is accurately 
addressed by the defense counsel as "gentlemen," i.e., it consists entirely of white men, pro­
bably landowners. See, e.g., Day v. Commonwealth, 43 Va. (2 Gratt.) 562 (1845); 44 Va. 
(3 Gratt.) 629 (1846) (new trial for free mulatto defendant convicted of rape of white woman 
because of evidence that one juror was not a landowner in the county where the trial was held). 
37 The district attorney responded to the defense's claim in the Petit case, discussed supra 
note 36, by arguing that a legal system controlled by whites made lynching unnecessary because 
it had the same result: 
During the reconstruction days, when we had negro domination in this state, the Kuklux 
Klans were organized and the best people of the state shouldered their guns for the 
protection of our white people. During those days white people were thrown into jail 
and tried by negro justices of the peace and negro juries. Now we have no more negro 
domination, but a government by the white people, and hence no necessity for lyn­
ching ..•• [T]he fact that this negro is given a fair trial is no reason why you should 
believe him innocent. 
119 La. at 1016, 44 So. at 849 (quoting the district attorney) (emphasis added). Although the 
defendant claimed the district attorney's argument was prejudicial, the Supreme Court of 
Louisiana affirmed the conviction, commenting: "While this discussion of matters outside 
of the record was highly improper, and should have been, in its inception, repressed by the 
trial judge, we fail to perceive in the remarks of the district attorney any appeal to racial pre­
judice for the purpose of influencing the jury." /d. at 1017, 44 So. at 849. 
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to describe the legal system's treatment of Black men.38 Well past 
the first third of the twentieth century, courts were often coerced 
by violent mobs, which threatened to execute the defendant themselves 
unless the court convicted him.39 Such mobs often did lynch the 
defendant if the judicial proceedings were not acceptable to them.40 
A contemporary authority on lynching commented in 1934 that "the 
local sentiment whic4 would make a lynching possible would insure 
a conviction in the courts."41 Even if the mob was not overtly 
pressuring for execution, a Black defendant accused of raping a white 
woman faced a hostile, racist legal system.42 State court submission 
to mob pressure is well illustrated by the most famous series of cases 
about interracial rape, the Scottsboro cases of the 1930s.43 Eight 
young Black men were convicted of what the Alabama Supreme Court 
called "a most foul and revolting crime,"44 which was the rape of 
"two defenseless white girls."45 The defendants were summarily 
sentenced to death based on minimal and dubious evidence, having 
been denied effective assistance of counsel. 46 The Alabama Supreme 
Court upheld the convictions in opinions demonstrating relentless 
determination to hold the defendants guilty regardless of strong 
evidence that mob pressure had influenced the verdicts and the weak 
evidence presented against the defendants. In one decision, that court 
affirmed the trial court's denial of a change of venue on the grounds 
that the mobs' threats of harm were not imminent enough although 
the National Guard had been called out to protect the defendants 
from mob executions.47 The U.S. Supreme Court later recognized 
38 Chadbourn, infra note 39, at 332. 
39 A. RAPER, supra note 21, at 143; Chadbourn, Plan for Survey of Lynching and the 
Judicial Process, 9 N.C. L. REv. 330, 332-33 (1931); see Thompson v. State, Il7 Ala. 67, 
23 So. 676 (1898) (change of venue granted for Black defendant accused of rape because threats 
of mob violence threatened defendant's imminent death or would pressure jury into convic­
ting); see also R. WILKINs, RAPE: A CASE HisToRY OF MURDER, TERROR AND lNrusncE VISITED 
UPON A NEGRO CoMMUNITY (1949). 
'll Chadboi,II'n, supra note 39, at 331. 
41 Chadbourn, Lynching and the Law, 20 A.B.A.J. 71 (1934). 
42 Burns, Black People and the Tyranny of American Law, 407 ANNALS, Spring 1973, at 
156, 159-60. 
43 Patterson v. State, 224 Ala. 531, 141 So. 195 (1932); Powell v. State, 224 Ala. 540, 141 
So. 201 (1932); Weems v. State, 224 Ala. 524, 141 So. 215 (1932). 
44 Powell v. State, 224 Ala. 540, 544, 141 So. 201, 204 (1932). 
45 /d. at 548, 141 So. at 207. 
46 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932). 
47 Patterson v. State, 224 Ala. 531, 534, 141 So. 195, 196 (1932); Powell v. State, 224 Ala. 
540, 545-46, 141 So. 201, 205-06 (1932). 
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that the proceedings had in fact taken place in an atmosphere of 
''tense, hostile, and excited public sentiment."48 After a lengthy ap­
pellate process, including three favorable Supreme Court rulings, 49 
all of the Scottsboro defendants were released, having spent a total 
of 104 years in prison. ~0 
In addition, courts applied special doctrinal rules to Black defen­
dants accused of the rape or attempted rape of white women. 51 One 
such rule allowed juries to consider the race of the defendant and 
victim in drawing factual conclusions as to the defendant's intent in 
attempted rape cases. If the accused was Black and the victim white, 
the jury was entitled to draw the inference, based on race alone, that 
he intended to rape her. One court wrote, "In determining the ques­
tion of intention, the jury may consider social conditions and customs 
founded upon racial differences, such as that the prosecutrix was 
a white woman and defendant was a Negro man."52 The "social 
conditions and customs founded upon racial differences" which the 
jury was to consider included the assumption that Black men always 
and only want to rape white women,S3 and that a white woman 
would never consent to sex with a Black man. 54 
.cs Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 51 (1932); see also C. NoRIUS & S. WASHINGTON, THE 
LAST OF THE SCOTTSBORO BoYS 19-25 (1979). 
49 Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935) (systematic and arbitrary exclusion of Blacks 
from jury lists resulting in exclusion of Blacks from juries constitutes denial of Fourteenth 
Amendment due process rights); Patterson v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 600 (1935) (state Supreme 
Court must consider defendants' claim of systematic exclusion of Blacks from juries despite 
defendants' failure to flle timely bill of exceptions in light of Supreme Court's decision on 
identical facts in Norris v. Alabama that such claims have merit); Powell v. Alabama, 287 
U.S. 45 (1932) (defendant accused of capital crime has due process right to counsel that includes 
right to consult with counsel and prepare a defense). 
so C. NoRIUS & S. WASHINGTON, supra note 48. 
'
1 Chastity evidence, for example, was treated differently for Black and white defendants, 
see infra text accompanying notes 145-155. 
'
2 McQuirter v. State, 36 Ala. App. 707, 709, 63 So. 2d 388, 390 (1953) (citations omit­
ted). In this case, the defendant, a Black man who had never before been arrested, was found 
guilty of an "attempt to commit an assault with intent to rape." ld. at 708, 63 So. 2d at 388. 
He was accused of muttering something unintelligible and walking within six feet of Mrs. Ted 
Allen, a white woman. Jd. at 708, 63 So. 2d at 389. See Pumphrey v. State, 156 Ala. 103, 
107-o8, 47 So.156,158 (1908); Kelleyv. State, I Ala. App. 133, 135,56 So. 15, 15-16 (1911). 
'
3 See supra notes 33-35. Many opinions graphically illustrate this assumption, for exam­
ple: "[T]he accused, a negro, under the excitement of lust and with the intention of gratifying 
it by force, entered the bedroom of Mrs. Crimm, a white woman .•.. There was nothing in 
the evidence to indicate that Mrs. Crimm was not virtuous .... "Pumphrey v. State, 156 Ala. 
103, 107, 47 So. 156, 158 (1908). Note the significan~ to the court, even in this situation, 
that "Mrs. Crimm" is "virtuous." See Barnett v. State, 83 Ala. 40, 3 So. 612 (1878); Kelley 
v. State, 1 Ala. App. 133,56 So.15 (1911); Dorseyv. State, 108 Ga. 477, 34 S.E. 135 (1899). 
See infra text accompanying notes 140-155. 
S4 See. e.g., Story v. State, 178 Ala. 98, 5 So. 480 (1912}, discussed infra text accompany­
ing notes 149-150. 
HeinOnline -- 6 Harv. Women’s L. J.  111 1983
112 Harvard Women's Law Journal [Vol. 6 
The Georgia Supreme Court of 1899 was even more explicit about 
the significance of race in the context of attempted rape, and par­
ticularly about the motivations of Black men. It held that race may 
properly be considered ''to rebut any presumption that might other­
wise arise in favor of the accused that his intention was to obtain 
the consent of the female, upon failure of which he would abandon 
his purpose to have sexual intercourse with her."55 Such a rebuttal 
denied to Black defendants procedural protection that was accorded 
white defendants. 
Judicial attitudes toward the rape of white women by Black men 
are also manifested in the factual descriptions of the crime in opinions. 
Courts sometimes created pornographic images of the events of the 
rape.56 One court, for example, wrote, "[The victim,] while clad 
only in her pajamas was forced to a remote spot some two blocks 
from her home, where battered, bruised, bleeding and exhausted she 
was overpowered .... " 57 The sense of disgusted fascination that 
such opinions convey is not paralleled in cases where offender and 
victim are both white. 58 • 
The outcome of this disparate treatment of Black men by the legal 
system was often the same as lynching-death.59 Between 1930 and 
1967, thirty-six percent of the Black men who were convicted of raping 
a white woman were executed. 60 In stark contrast, only two percent 
55 Dorsey v. State, 108 Ga. 477, 480, 34 S.E. 135, 136-37 (1899). This rule was not used 
where both parties were Black. See Washington v. State, 138 Ga. 370, 75 S.E. 253 (1912); 
see infra text accompanying notes 106-108. 
56 That the descriptions were pornographic was pointed out to the author by Karen 
Getman. 
"Maxwell v. State, 236 Ark. 694, 697, 370 S.W. 2d 113, 115 (1963); see Vanleeward v. 
State, 220 Ga. 135, 136, 137 S.E. 2d 452, 453 (1964). 
58 For example, in Rice v. State, 35 Fla. 236, 17 So. 286 (1895), the court drily notes "the 
plaintiff in error was convicted of the crime of rape upon one Helen Smith, his stepdaughter." 
59 In 1965, 18 American jurisdictions allowed the death penalty for rape. Wolfgang & 
Reidel, Race, Judicial Discretion and the Death Penalty 407 ANNALS 120 (1973). Hugo Bed au 
has written that most criminologists think capital punishment for rape was "introduced in 
order to Keep the Nigras in line" and "had nothing to do with its deterrent effect." Bailey, 
Rape and the Death Penalty: A Neglected Area of Deterrence Research, in CAPITAL PUNISH· 
MENT IN TilE UNITED STATES 336 (H. Bedau & C. Pierce eds. 1975) (citing unpublished letter) 
(emphasis in the original). 
60 Wolfgang, Racial Discrimination in the Death Sentence for Rape, in EXECUTIONS IN 
AMERICA, supra note 13, at 116. A systematic analysis of 1238 convictions for rape between 
1945 and 1965 examined many variables in addition to race, such as presence of a weapon 
and prior record of the defendant, to attempt to account for the disparate numbers of execu­
tions. The study concluded that race was the only factor that accounted for the disparities. 
/d. at 114-20. The Wolfgang study is unique in its methodology and conclusiveness. It sup­
ports a larger body of prior research summarized in id. at 110-11. 
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of all defendants convicted of rape involving other racial combina­
tions were executed. 61 As a result of such disparate treatment, 
eighty-nine percent of the men executed for rape in this country were 
Black.62 While execution rates for all crimes were much higher for 
Black men than for white men, the differential was most dramatic 
when the crime was the rape of a white woman. 63 
The Legacy Today 
The patterns that began in slavery and continued long afterwards 
have left a powerful legacy that manifests itself today in several ways. 
Although the death penalty for rape has been declared 
unconstitutional, 64 the severe statutory penalties for rape65 continue 
to be applied in a discriminatory manner. A recent study concluded 
that Black men convicted of raping white women receive more serious 
sanctions than all other sexual assault defendants.66 A recent 
attitudinal study found that white potential jurors treated Black and 
white defendants similarly when the victim was Black. However, 
61 Id. at 110-13; see Mann & Selva, supra noteS. 
62 Wolfgang & Reidel, supra note 59. 
63 Wolfgang, supra note 60, at 110-13. The NAACP-LDEF challenged the constitutionality 
of the death penalty partly on the grounds that the execution rate disparities for rape con­
stituted racial discrimination. M. MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL 73-105 (1973). This argu­
ment was not accepted by the Supreme Court in its decision limiting the circumstances in which 
the death penalty could constitutionally be imposed. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 
92 S. Ct. 2726 (1972). A striking example of opposition to this type of argument is the response 
of the Supreme Court of Arkansas in 1962 to evidence that over a recent 47 year period, 9SOJo 
of the executions for rape had been of Black men (19 out of 20) and 72.90Jo of the executions 
for murder had been of Black men or women (108 out of 148). See Maxwell v. State, 236 
Ark. 694, 370 S.W.2d 113 (1963). The court rejected the idea that such statistics proved 
discrimination, concluding: 
Certainly there was no evidence offered even remotely suggesting that the ratio of violent 
crimes by Negroes and Whites was different from the ratio of the executions. There 
was no testimony suggesting that the State's attorneys in the various judicial districts 
had not been asking for the death penalty in their prosecutions for rape, whether the 
accused be black or white. 
I d. at 701. This demonstrates an acceptance of the stereotypes of Black male criminality, see 
supra note 34, and rapaciousness, see supra note 35. 
64 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977). 
65 In almost half the states today, the maximum punishment for rape is life imprisonment. 
JURORS, supra note 16, at 207-458. 
65 LaFree, The Effect of Sexual Stratification by Race on Official Reactions to Rape, 45 
AMBit. Soc. REv. 842, 852 (1980). 
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Black defendants received more severe punishment than white defen­
dants when the victim was white. 67 
The rape of white women by Black men is also used to justify harsh 
rape penalties. One of the few law review articles written before 1970 
that takes a firm position in favor of strong rape laws to secure con­
victions begins with a long quote from a newspaper article describ­
ing rapes by three Black men, who at 3 a.m. on Palm Sunday "broke 
into a West Philadelphia home occupied by an eighty-year-old widow, 
her forty-four-year-old daughter and fourteen-year-old grand­
daughter," brutally beat and raped the white women, and left the 
grandmother unconscious "lying in a pool of blood."68 This 
introduction presents rape as a crime committed by violent Black 
men against helpless white women. It is an image of a highly atypical 
rape-the defendants are Black and the victims white, the defendants 
and victims are strangers to each other, extreme violence is used, and 
it is a group rape. Contemporaneous statistical data on forcible rapes 
reported to the Philadelphia police department reveals that this rape 
case was virtually unique.69 Use of this highly unrepresentative 
image of rape to justify strict rape laws70 is consistent with recent 
research showing that it is a prevalent, although false, belief about 
rape that the most common racial combination is Black offender and 
white victim.71 
67 JuRORS, supra note 16, at 117-18. This difference is not solely attributable to the type 
of crime at issue, since many studies show that Black defendants usually receive stricter sentences 
than white defendants for crimes committed against whites other than rape, id. at 117, and 
that white jurors are generally lenient on Black defendants who commit crimes against Blacks. 
Note, The Case for Black Jurors, 19 YALE L.J. 531, 534 (1970). But the degree of misinfor­
mation and sensationalism associated with the accusation of rape is unique. See infra note 71. 
63 Schwartz, The Effect in Philadelphia of Pennsylvania's Increased Penalties for Rape and 
Attempted Rape, 59 J. CRw. L., CRIMINOLOGY, & POLICE BEHAVIOR 509 (1968). The author 
concludes that the increased penalties for rape did not reduce the incidence of rape. 
69 M. AMIR, infra note 116. Out of 343 rapes reported to the Philadelphia police, 3.3o/o 
involved Black defendants accused of raping white women, id. at 44; 42o/o involved complaints 
of stranger rape, id. at 250; 20.So/o involved brutal beatings, id. at 155-56; 430Jo involved group 
rapes, id. at 200. 
70 In October 1969, The Thunderbolt, the newspaper of the National States Rights Party, 
carried a strikingly similar image. At the bottom of the page was a drawing of the FBI's crime 
time clock, with a caption proclaiming: "Every thirty minutes, a woman is RAPED somewhere 
in the U.S.A." Dominating the top of the page was the phrase "THE BLACK PLAGUE," 
next to a drawing of a large unkempt Black man with a knife, running toward the reader 
and away from a tangled pile of grass. On close examination, what appeared initially as grass 
was revealed as the virtually subliminal image of a partly disrobed, prone blonde white woman. 
This image is reproduced in L. CURTIS, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE 22 (1974). 
71 In answer to the question, "Among which racial combination do most rapes occur?" 48% 
of respondents stated Black males and white females, 3o/o stated white males and Black females, 
16% stated Black males and Black females, 33o/o stated white males and white females. JURORS, 
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Charges of rapes committed by Black men against white women 
are still surrounded by sensationalism 72 and public pressure for 
prosecution. Black men seem to face a special threat of being unjustly 
prosecuted or convicted.73 One example is Willie Sanders.74 Sanders 
is a Black Boston man who was arrested and charged with the rapes 
of four young white women after a sensational media campaign and 
intense pressure on the police to apprehend the rapist. Although the 
rapes continued after Sanders was incarcerated, and the evidence 
against him was extremely weak, the state subjected him to a vigorous 
twenty-month prosecution. After a lengthy and expensive trial, and 
an active public defense, he was eventually acquitted.75 Although 
Sanders was clearly innocent, he could have been convicted; he and 
his family suffered incalculable damage despite his acquittal. 
Another recent example is the Alabama case of Thomas Lee 
Hines. 76 Hines is a young mentally retarded Black man who was ac­
cused of raping several white women. The trial judge granted a change 
of venue, noting, ''the facts of the race of the defendant and victims 
have so overpowered the case as to make it appear to the community 
as a racial incident."" Hines' trial was transferred to a nearby coun­
ty, where he was convicted by an all-white jury in proceedings marked 
by frequent outbursts from spectators, sensationalist press coverage, 
supra note 16, at 80. Recent victim survey data contradicts this prevalent belief; more than 
four-fifths of illegal rapes reported to researchers were between members of the same race, 
and white/Black rapes roughly equaled Black/white rapes. Bowker, supra note 2, at 172. In 
that text, there is a misprint so that the sentence reads: "nearly four-fifths of all rapes were 
interracial." /d. While the context makes clear that "intraracial" is intended, it is fascinating 
that this particular typographical error slipped past all proofreaders. For a discussion of rape 
statistics, see supra note 2. 
72 See Abbott & Calonico, Black Man, White Woman- The Maintenance of a Myth: Rape 
and the Press in New Orleans, in CRIME AND DELINQUENCY: DIMENSIONS OF DEVIANCE 141 
(M. Riedel & T. Thornberry eds. 1974); Evans, supra note 13, at 75; Stem, The Right of the 
Accused to a Public Defense, 18 HAR.v. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. (forthcoming 1983). 
73 Several commentators have noted recent rape convictions of Black men accused of raping 
white women that seem to be based on inadequate evidence. See A. DAVIS, WoMEN, RAcE 
AND CLAss, 172-75 (1981); SociALIST WoMEN's CAucus oF ~oUISVII.I.E, THE RAciST USE OF 
RAPE AND THE RAPE CHARGE (July 1975) (on me at the HARv. WoMEN'S L.J.); BRADEN, A 
Second Open Letter to Southern White Women, 4 SoUTHERN EXPOSURE 50 (Winter 1977); 
Evans, supra note 13, at 80. 
74 Suffolk Superior Court Indictnient No. 025027-36, 025077 (1980). 
75 See Stem, supra note 72; Sands, Rape and Racism in Boston: An Open Letter to White 
Feminists, OFF OUR BACKS, Jan. 1980, at 16-17; THE WILLIE SANDERS DEFENSE CoMMITTEE, 
FROM ScoTTSBORO 1930 TO BosTON 1980: THE FRAME-UP CoNTINUES (1980). 
76 Hines v. State, 384 So. 1171 (Ala. Crim. App. 1980). This case was brought to the 
attention of the author by Stephanie Y. Moore. 
77 Id. at 1183. 
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and extensive security to protect the courtroom participants. 78 The 
appellate court granted a new trial because police behavior coupled 
with the degree of Hines' retardation called into question the volun­
tariness of his statements to the police, and stated that the court found 
that the racially charged trial conditions justified a second change 
of venue.79 Hines was eventually declared incompetent for trial and 
committed to a state institution. 80 
Conclusion 
From slavery to the present day, the legal system has consistently 
treated the rape of white women by Black men with more harshness 
than any other kind of rape. The punishment for Black of­
fender/white victim rape has ranged historically from castration, to 
death by torture and lynching, to executions. Today Black men con­
victed of raping white women receive longer prison sentences than 
other rape defendants. Innocent Black men also face the threat of 
racially motivated prosecutions. 
This selective focus is significant in several ways. First, since 
tolerance of coerced sex has been the rule rather than the exception, 
it is clear that the rape of white women by Black men has been treated 
seriously not because it is coerced sex and thus damaging to women, 
but because it is threatening to white men's power over both "their" 
women and Black men.81 Second, in treating Black offender/white 
78 Id. at 1183. 
79 Id. at 1181, 1183. 
80 N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1980, at A17, col. 4. 
81 Part of the reason for this social meaning of rape is that laws against rape originate in 
the conception of women as property. SeeS. BROWNMILLER, supra note 13, at 7-10, 201; L. 
CLARK & D. LEWIS, RAPE: THE PRICE OF COERCIVE SEXUALITY 115-32 (1977); THE SECOND 
AssAULT, supra note 3, at 24; Comment, supra note 2, at 924-25. 
In nineteenth century cases and literature, this notion sometimes took the form of discuss­
ing women as "goods." For example, in one rape case where a slave was accused of raping 
a white woman, force was an element of the crime, but since there was no evidence of force, 
the Alabama Supreme Court wrote: 
There was, in this case, at least some evidence tending to show that the act of the prisoner 
was an attempt to accomplish his object by fraudulent personation of the husband •••. 
[W]e depart from our usual course, for the purpose of inviting the attention of the 
legislature to this subject. Under our penal laws, one who obtains the goods of another 
under false and fradulent pretenses, is held guilty ... as if he had feloniously stolen 
them. He who contaminates female purity under like fraudulent pretenses, goes un­
whipped of justice. 
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victim illegal rape much more harshly than all coerced sex experienced 
by Black women and most coerced sex experienced by white women, 
the legal system has implicitly condoned the latter forms of rape. 
Third, this treatment has contributed to a paradigmatic but false con­
cept of rape as being primarily a violent crime between strangers where 
the perpetrator is Black and the victim white. Finally, this pattern 
is perverse and discriminatory because rape is painful and degrading 
to both Black and white victims82 regardless of the attacker's race. 83 
PART II: THE DENIAL OF THE 
RAPE OF BLACK WOMEN 
Who knows what the black woman thinks of rape? Who has asked 
her? Who cares? -ALicE WALKER84 
The selective acknowledgement of the existence and seriousness 
of the rape of white women by Black men has been accompanied 
by a denial of the rape of Black women that began in slavery and 
continues today. Because of racism and sexism, very little has been 
written about this denial. Mainstr~am American history has ignored 
the role of Black people to a large extent; systematic research into 
Black history has been published only recently. 85 The experiences of 
Black women have yet to be fully recognized in those histories, 86 
although this is beginning to change. 87 Indeed, very little has been 
written about rape from the perspective of the victim, Black or white, 
Lewis, a slave, v. State, 30 Ala. 54, 56-57 (1857). For explanations of how the conception 
of women as property links with the creation of myths about the Black male as rapist, see 
A. DwoRKIN, RIGHT-WING WoMEN 124 (1983); Mann & Selva, supra note 5, at 170. 
82 Powerful poems about the effects of rape on its victims have been published in the last 
decade, by both Black and white women. See, e.g., Jordan, Poem About My Rights, AEGIS, 
March-Apr. 1979, at 31; M. PIERCY, Rape Poem, in LIVING IN THE OPEN (1976); Shange, 
is noiso gd to be born a girl, 10 Tm BLACK ScHoLAR, May-June 1979, at 8-9. This is not 
to assert that Black and white women's experiences have been identical. See Part II, infra 
text accompanying notes 84-124. 
83 Evans, supra note 13, at 81. 84 A. WALKER, Advancing Luna-and Ida B. Wells, in You CAN'T KEEP A GooD WOMAN 
DOWN 85, 93 (1981). 
85 Beale, Slave of a Slave No More: Black Women in Struggle, 12 THE BLAcK ScHOLAR, 
Nov.-Dec. 1981, at 16. 
86 Id. 
mG. LERNER, supra note 28; BUT SoME OF Us ARE BRAVE: BLACK WoMEN's STUDIES (G. 
Hull, P. Scott & B. Smith eds. 1982); CoNDmONs: FivE, Autumn 1979 (The Black Women's 
Issue); 2 HEREsiES, Fall1979 (Third World Women: The Politics of Being Other); 8 SoJoURNER, 
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until quite recently.88 Research about Black women rape victims en­
counters all these obstacles. 
Slavery 
The rape of Black women hy white men during slavery was 
commonplace and was used as a crucial weapon of white 
supremacy.89 White men had what one commentator called "institu­
tionalized access" to Black women.90 The rape of Black women by 
white men cannot be attributed to unique Southern pathology, 
however, for numerous accounts exist of northern armies raping Black 
women while they were "liberating" the South.91 
The legal system rendered the rape of Black women by any man, 
white or Black, invisible. The rape of a Black woman was not a 
crime.92 In 1859 the Mississippi Supreme Court dismissed the indict­
ment of a male slave for the rape of a female slave less than 10 years 
old, saying: 
[T]his indictment can not be sustained, either at common law 
or under our statutes. It charges no offense known to either 
system. [Slavery] was unknown to the common law ... and hence 
its provisions are inapplicable .... There is no act (of our 
legislature on this subject) which embraces either the attempted 
or actual commission of a rape by a slave on a female slave .... 
Masters and slaves can not be governed by the same system or 
laws; so different are their positions, rights and duties.93 
Jan. 1983 (Special Issue: Women of Color); Jones, My Mother was Much of a Woman: Black 
Women, Work and the Family Under Slavery, 8 FEMINIST STUDIES 235 (1982); 9 THE BLACK 
SociOLOGIST, Spring/Summer 1982 (special issue entitled New Thoughts on Feminism, Race 
Relations and Social Change); Reagon, My Black Mothers and Sisters or On Beginning a 
Cultural Autobiography, 8 FEMINIST STUDIES 81 (1982); Smith, Racism and Women's Studies, 
S FRONTIERS, Winter 1980, at 48; Spelman, The Erasure of Black Women S QuEST 36 (1982). 
83 See infra note 212. , . 
89 S. BROWNMILLER, supra note 13, at 165; A. DAVIS, supra note 73, at 24-27 (1981); B. 
HooKS, AIN'T I A WoMAN: BLACK WoMEN AND FEMINISM 24-27 (1981); G. LERNER, supra 
note 28, at 149-50; J. NoBLE, BEAUTIFUL ALso ARE THE SoULS OF MY BLACK SISTERS 35 (1978); 
see DuBois, Divine Right, in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 26, at 53. ( 
90 L. CURTIS, supra note 70, at 22. 
91 H. GUTMAN, THE BLACK FAMILY IN SLAVERY AND FREEDOM 175D-1925, at 386-87 (1978). 
92 See supra text accompanying notes 13-14. 
93 George, a slave, v. State, 37 Miss. 306 (1859). The following year the state legislature, 
evidently shocked by the decision, outlawed attempted or actual rape of a Black or mulatto 
female under 12 by a Black or mullato male, and made it punishable by death or whipping. 
1860 Miss. Laws 62. The legislature refused to recognize the rape of adult Black females and 
the rape of any Black females by white men. 
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This decision is illuminating in several respects. First, Black men are 
held to lesser standards of sexual restraint with Black women than 
are white men with white women.94 Second, white men are held to 
lesser standards of restraint with Black women than are Black men 
with white women.95 Neither white nor Black men were expected to 
show sexual restraint with Black women. 96 
The Post-Civil War Period 
Mter the Civil War, the widespread rape of Black women by white 
men persisted.97 Black women were vulnerable to rape in several 
ways that white women were not. First, the rape of Black women 
was used as a weapon of group terror by white mobs and by the Ku 
Klux Klan during Reconstruction.98 Second, because Black women 
worked outside the home, 99 they were exposed to employers' sexual 
aggression as white women who worked inside the home were 
not.100 
The legal system's denial that Black women experienced sexual 
abuse by both white and Black men also persisted, 101 although 
94 
''Whites, perhaps originally to perpetuate breeding, encouraged the identity of Black 
males in terms of uninhibited sexuality •••• It seems clear that the Black male was given sex­
uallicense by the White patriarchy in exchange for his economic and political autonomy." 
THE SECOND AssAULT, supra note 3, at 30-31; see B. HooKS, supra note 89, at 35; G. LERNER, 
supra note 28, at 194. The "sexual license" of course did not extend to white women. !d. at 31-33. 
The comparison between masters and slaves in George v. State, 37 Miss. 306 (1859), implies 
that real standards of sexual restraint were applied to white men's behavior toward white women, 
an assumption questioned in Part III of this Note, infra text accompanying notes 138-180. 
9
' See supra text accompanying notes 5-17. 
96 R. STAPLES, THE BLAcK WoMAN IN AMERICA 40 (1973); B. HooKS, supra note 89, at 
32-34. 
97 See H. GUTMAN, supra note 91, at 390; B. HooKS, supra note 89, at 52, 56-59; G. 
LERNER, supra note 28, at 173-93. 
98 See G. LERNER, supra note 28, at 172-81. 
99 See B. HooKS, supra note 89, at 22, 71-72; G. LERNER, supra note 28, at xxiv; J. NoBLE, 
supra note 89, at 46; Beckett, Working Women: A Historical Review of Racial Differences, 
9 THE BLACK SociOLOOIST 5 (1982). Analyses of women's situations which assume the ''tradi­
tional women's role" to be that of housewife, and treat ''women's" introduction into the 
workforce as a relatively recent phenomena, effectively deny the existence of Black women. 
While this denial has been pointed out in many publications, recent examples of it exist. See, 
e.g., Taub & Schneider, Perspectives on Women:S Subordination and the Role of Law, in 
THE Pounc:S OF LAw, supra note 8, at 125-26. 
100 See B. HooKS, supra note 89, at 56-59. The myths concerning Black women's promis­
cuity probably contributed to the sexual abuse of Black women by white employers. 
101 Bell Hooks discusses newspaper articles urging the public to take action in opposition 
to the rape of Black women, B. HooKS, supra note 89, at 56-59. The author of this Note 
has been unable to find any legal literature on the rape of Black women either during or after 
slavery. 
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statutes had been made race-neutral. 102 Even if a Black victim's case 
went to trial-in itself highly unlikely103 - procedural barriers and 
prejudice against Black women protected any man accused of rape 
or attempted rape. 104 The racist rule which facilitated prosecutions 
of Black offender/white victim attempted rapes by allowing the jury 
to consider the defendant's race as evidence of his intent,105 for in­
stance, was not applied where both persons were "of color and there 
was no evidence of their social standing." 106 That is, the fact that 
a defendant was Black was considered relevant only to prove intent 
to rape a white woman; it was not relevant to prove intent to rape 
a Black woman. By using disparate procedures, the court implicitly 
makes two assertions. First, Black men do not want to rape Black 
women with the same intensity or regularity that Black men want 
to rape white women.107 Second, Black women do not experience 
coerced sex in the sense that white women experience it. 103 
These attitudes reflect a set of myths about Black women's sup­
posed promiscuity which were used to excuse white men's sexual abuse 
102 See supra note 18. 
103 The process that white rape victims must go through in pursuing a rape complaint bas 
· been shown to be arduous and taxing. See L. HeLMSTROM & A. BURGESS, THE VICTIM OF RAPE: 
INSTITUTiONAL REACTIONS 30-62 (1978) [hereinafter cited as THE VICTIM OF RAPEI; Note, supra 
note 17, at 347-51; Comment, supra note 2, at 937-38; Comment, The Rape Victim: A Victim 
of Society and the Law, 11 WILLAMEITE L.J. 36, 43-49 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Comment, 
The Rape Victim]. The treatment by the legal system of a Black rape victim in the first half 
Of this century was incalculably worse. SeeS. GRIFFIN, RAPE: THE POWER OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
14 (1979) (description of the treatment Billie Holiday received after having been raped at age 10). 
104 Traditional common-law rules which made rape generally a difficult crime to prove pro­
tected the defendant. See infra note 159. In addition, Black women's claims were not taken 
seriously regardless of the offender's race. In a 1971 study on judges' attitudes towards rape 
victims, a judge was quoted as saying: "with the Negro community, you really have to redefine 
rape. You never know about them." Bohmer, Judicial Attitudes Towards Rape Victims, 51 
JUDICATURE 303 (1974). A vivid example of the judicial system's response to Black women's 
claims of sexual harassment is the account by a nurse published in 1912: 
I remember well the first and last work place from which I was dismissed. I lost my 
place because I refused to let the madam's husband kiss me •..• I didn't know then 
what has been a burden to my mind and heart ever since; that a colored woman's vir­
tue in this part of the country has no protection. When my husband went to the man 
who had insulted me, the man •.• had him arrested! I ••• testified on oath to the insult 
offered me. The white man, of course, denied the charge. The old judge looked up 
and said: 'This court will never take the word of a nigger against the word of a white man.' 
More Slavery at the South, 72 THE INDEPENDENT, Jan. 25, 1912, at 197-200, reprinted in 
G. LERNER, supra note 28, at 155-56. 
105 See supra text accompanying notes 52-55. 
106 Washington v. State, 38 Ga. 370, 75 S.E. 253 (1912). 
107 See supra note 35. 
108 See B. HooKS, supra note 89, at 52. 
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of Black women.109 An example of early twentieth century assump­
tions about Black women's purported promiscuity was provided by 
the Florida Supreme Court in 1918. In discussing whether the prior 
chastity of the victim in a statutory rape case should be presumed 
subject to defendant's rebuttal or should be an element of the crime 
which the state must prove, the court explained that: 
What has been said by some of our courts about an unchaste 
female being a comparatively rare exception is no doubt true 
where'the population is composed largely of the Caucasian race, 
but we would blind ourselves to actual conditions if we adopted 
this rule where another race that is largely immoral constitutes 
an appreciable part of the population.110 
Cloaking itself in the mantle of legal reasoning, the court states 
that most young white women are virgins, that most young Black 
women are not, and that unchaste women are immoral. The tradi­
tional law of statutory rape at issue in the above-quoted case pro­
vides that women who are not "chaste" cannot be raped. 111 Because 
of the way the legal system considered chastity, 112 the association of 
Black women with unchastity meant not only that Black women could 
not be victims of statutory rape, but also that they would not be 
recognized as victims of forcible rape. 
The Legacy Today 
The criminal justice system continues to take the rape of Black 
women less seriously than the rape of white women. Studies show 
that judges generally impose harsher sentences for rape when the vic­
tim is white than when the victim is Black.113 The behavior of white 
109 Id. at 54-85; G. LERNER, supra note 28, at 163-71; J. NoBLE, supra note 89,.at 47. 
110 Dallas v. State, 76 Fla. 358, 79 So. 690 (1918), quoted in Note, Statutory Rape: Previoas 
Chaste Character in Florida, 13 U. FLA.. L. REv. 201, 203-04 (1960). 
111 JURORS, supra note 16, at 167; Bienen, supra note 8, at 192. ~ 
111 The operation of traditional laws and conceptions of rape that depend on victil!l.S' prior 
chastity is discussed in greater detail at infra text accompanying notes 140-155. 
113 LaFree, supra note 66, at 847-48. A 1968 study of rape sentencing in Maryland revealed 
that in all 55 cases where the death penalty was imposed the victim had been white, and that 
between 1960 and 1967, 47% of all Black men convicted of criminal assaults on Black women 
were intmediately released on probation. The average sentence received by Black men, exclusive 
of cases involving life imprisonment or death, was 4.2 years if the victim was Black, 16.4 years 
if the victim was white. Howard, Racial Discrimination in Sentencing, 59 JUDICATURE 121, 
123 (1975). 
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jurors shows a similar bias. A recent study found that sample white 
jurors imposed significantly lighter sentences on defendants whose 
victims were Black than on defendants whose victims were white. 114 
Black jurors exhibited no such bias. m 
Evidence concerning police behavior also documents the fact that 
the claims of Black rape victims are taken less seriously than those 
of whites. 116 A 1968 study of Philadelphia police processing deci­
sions concluded that the differential in police decisions to charge for 
rape "resulted primarily from a lack of confidence in the veracity 
of Black complainants and a belief in the myth of .Black 
promiscuity." 117 
The thorough denial of Black women's experiences of rape by the 
legal system is especially shocking in light of the fact that Black 
women are much more likely to be victims of rape than are white 
women. 118 Based on data from national .surveys of rape victims, 119 
"the profile of the most frequent rape victim is a young woman, 
divorced or separated, Black and poverty stricken." 120 
Recent victim survey data shows that of the roughly one-fifth of 
illegal rapes that are interracial, Black men were as likely to rape 
white women as white men were to rape Black women. 121 The 
statistics concerning Black women's rape by white men, however, may 
be too low. Black women apparently underreport illegal rape to the 
police-especially rape by white men122-and may do the same with 
114 JURORS, supra note 16, at 106. 
mId. at 119. 
116 SeeM. AMIR, PATIERNS IN FoRcmLE RAPE 11 (1971); Peters, The Philadelphia Rape 
Survey, in VICTIMoLOGY: A NEW Focus, VoL. III, CRIMEs, VICTIMS AND JurncE 186 (1. Drapkin 
& E. Viano eds. 1975) [hereinafter cited as VICTIMOLOGY 111]; Note, supra note 17, at 343. 
The relatively high credibility accorded white women's accusations of rape against Black men 
was mitigated if the woman was known to socialize with Blacks. 
117 Comment, Police Discretion and the Judgment that a Crime Has Been Committed­
Rape in Philadelphia, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 277, 304 (1968). 
118 Recent data from random citizen interviews suggest that Black women are much more 
likely to be victims of illegal rape than are white women. Bowker, supra note 2, at 164; see 
Karmen, Women Victims of Crime: Introduction 185, 188, in THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
AND WoMEN: OFFENDERS, VIcTIMS, WoRKERS (B. Price & N. Sokoloff eds. 1982). 
119 See supra note 2. 
120 Karmen, supra note 118, at 188. 
121 Bowker, supra note 2, at 172. 
122 There is conflicting commentary as to whether Black women are more or Jess likely than 
white women to report rape to the police. Lee Bowker explains that the National L.E.A.A. 
Survey published in 1976 found that, "[w]hite rape victims were much more likely to report 
the crime to the police (590Jo) than were Black rape victims (360Jo)." Bowker, supra note 2, 
at 173. Allen Johnson, however, claims, "the available evidence suggests that nonwhites are 
more likely than whites to report their assaults." Johnson, On the Prevalence of Rape in the 
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victim survey interviewers. Even if the victim survey data were 
accurate, the type of forced sex it studies is only a small fraction 
of the various kinds of sexual subordination to which women are 
subjected, 123 some of which are available disproportionately to 
white men.124 
Conclusion 
From slave~ "the present time; the rape of Black women has 
been denied by the legal system. During slavery, the rape of Black 
women by Black men was legal. The rape of Black women by white 
men was frequent, legal, and a crucial weapon of white supremacy., 
After the Civil War, the legal system's continued denial of the rape 
of Black women was manifested in discriminatory doctrinal rules and 
judicial language. Today Black women continue to suffer rape in 
disproportionate numbers, while the criminal justice system still takes 
the claims of Black rape victims less seriously than the claims of white 
victims. 
PART Ill: THE DENIAL OF THE 
SIGNIFICANCE OF SEXUAL COERCION 
The legal system and American society have acknowledged the 
existence and seriousness of one racial combination of rape-that 
United States, 6 SIGNS 136, 145 (1980). See infra notes 116 and 117, suggesting that police 
behavior may be an especial deterrent to Black women's reporting. When the race of the assailant 
is taken into account, there is agreement that Black women tend not to report rapes by white 
men. In a 1971 study of rape in Oakland, California, few Black women reported being raped 
by white men. One respondent told the questioners: "No Black woman would report being 
raped by a white man to the police in Oakland. They might report it to the Panthers, but 
never the police." Agopian, Chappell & Geis, Black Offender and White Victim: A Study 
of Forcible Rape in Oakland, California, in VICTJMOLOGY III, supra note 116, at 101 [hereinafter 
cited as Black Offender]. See L. CuRns, supra note 70; see als.o THE RACIST USE OF RAPE 
AND THE RAPE CHARGE, supra note 73, at 5-6 (discussion of the rape of Black women by 
Alabama police during the Civil Rights movement); A. DAVIS, supra note 73,.at 173 (the rape 
of Black women by Chicago police in 1974). 
123 See infra text accompanying notes 171-178. 
124 The opportunity for sexual harassment of womc;n employees by their employers or 
supervisors is disproportionately available to white men, who disproportionately hold such 
positions of power. See A. DAVIS, supra note 73, at 197-200. To acknowledge this is not to 
claim that Black men do not sexually harass women; both Black and white women have com­
plained of sexual harassment by Black men. C. MAcKINNoN, SEXUAL HARAssMENT OF WoRK­
ING WOMEN 30-31 (1979). 
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of white women by Black men. 125 Courts and commentators 
justified this focus by exaggerating the trauma white women face 
when raped by Black men. 126 This chacterization allowed the crime 
of rape to be narrowly defined and treated in a way that denied to 
all women an effective legal shield against rape. 127 Moreover, the 
myth that rape is only a crime committed by Black men against white 
women has obscured and deflected attention from the varied nature, 
pervasiveness, and influence of the sexual subordination to which 
all women are subjected. 128 
Characterizing White Women's Experiences 
Part of the justification given by white men for treating Black 
offender/white victim rape with special severity was that rape by a 
Black man felt worse, was worse, than rape by a white man. An 1889 
law review note on lynching bid its readers to "consider how pro­
foundly humiliated any woman must feel who has been the victim 
of an. outrage of this character, and how, under existing social con­
ditions. this humiliation must be greatly intensified by the wrong 
having been committed by a negro." 129 
White men also told white women that death was preferable to 
rape by a Black man. In one of the Scottsboro opinions130 the 
Alabama Supreme Court wrote, "some things may happen to one 
worse than death by an assassin. One of those things happened to 
this defenseless woman." 131 Thirty years later, in 1964, the Georgia 
125 See Part I, supra text accompanying notes 1-83. 
126 See infra text accompanying notes 129-132. 
127 See infra text accompanying notes 140-175. 
128 While there has been virtually no recognition that Black women experience any kind of 
sexual coercion, the illegal rape of white women has been recognized to some extent, albeit 
within the limits discussed in this Part. 
129 Reynolds, supra note 31, at 21. Note that, although the author refers to the humilia­
tion of "any woman," he means only white women. The notion that a Black woman could 
have been humiliated by a rape would have been virtually inconceivable. See notes 92-112 
and accompanying text. To the extent that the definition "woman" was limited by the helpless 
white woman image, Black women were excluded. The stereotype of the delicate, helpless 
white woman has never applied and has never been applied to Black women. Part of the reason 
for this is that Black women have been workers outside their households from slavery to the 
present. See supra note 99. But even with the recent recognition of the introduction of women 
into the workforce, the notion that Black women are not feminine persists, see B. Hooxs, 
supra note 89, at 83. 
130 See supra text accompanying notes 43-50. 
131 Powell v. State, 224 Ala. 540, 551, 141 So. 201, 211 (1932). 
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S~preme Court described the rape of a white woman by a Black man 
as. "a crill!e more horrible than death[,] ... the forcible sexual inva­
sion of her body, the temple of her soul," which "soil[ed] for life 
her purity, the most precious attribute of all mankind." 132 In foster­
ing racism, these characterizations presented a rationalization for the 
brutal murder of Black men.133 Yet they also created fear in white 
women and thus helped maintain their powerlessness134 - both by 
encouraging white women's physical dependence on white men, and 
by robbing women of the power to define their own sexual 
experiences .135 
The unstated converse of these characterizations is that for white 
women, rape by white men is better than death and not nearly as 
bad as rape by Black men. Indeed, the criminal justice system in prac­
tice has virtually denied the seriousness of the rape of white women 
other than in the rare circumstances where the offender is a violent 
Black man who is a stranger to the "virtuous" victim. 
The Legal System's Denial of Rape 
The 1897 law review article on lynching demonstrates great sym­
pathy for the rape complainant136 and does not explicitly doubt her 
132 Sims v. Balkcom, 220 Ga. 7, 136 S.E. 2d 766, 769 (1964). 
133 See Part I supra text accompanying notes 1-83. 
134 It is important to acknowledge that to say that something furthers racism is not to deny 
that it can also be sexist. LikeWise, to say that something contributes to sexism is not to deny 
that it can also be racist. Racism and sexism are complementary, not contradictory. For fur­
ther discussion, see Part IV, infra text accompanying notes 181-233. 
135 These characterizations embody two types of disempowerment. First is the disempower­
ment involved simply in having one's own experience defined by someone else. Second is the 
disempowering content of the definitions imposed. Here, the treatment of the rape victim 
after the rape is that of a stigmatized, ruined woman. An early description of the purported 
effect of rape on a virgin is Camp v. State, 3 Ga. 417, 422 (1847), which stated that after 
the loss of her virginity, "all is gone: her love of justice, sense of character, and regard for 
truth." This extreme stigmatization is perhaps decreasing, Sagarin, Forcible Rape and the Pro­
blem of the Rights of the Accused, FoRcmLE RAPE, supra note 2, at 142, but it nonetheless 
persists in powerful forms. The stigma is often internalized, which is also disempowering. 
See J. BARKAS, YICTWS 126 (1978); Peters, supra note 116, at 197. 
136 See supra note 129 and accompanying text. Reynolds argues that society's desire to spare 
the white woman the extreme humiliation she suffers from public cross-examination is the 
force behind lynching. Reynolds, supra note 31, at 21. This characterization of the causes 
of lynching is obviously incorrect. It uses false stereotypes of white women's extreme delicacy 
and the false idea that society sincerely aimed to protect white women from rape (this idea 
is refuted in Part Ill, supra text accompanying notes 125-180) to make lynching seem understan­
dable and even noble. 
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veracity. 137 These "feminist" attitudes are anomalous in the 
pre-1970s legal literature. 138 Except for the lynching article, the legal 
literature on rape shows concern solely for the defendant and 
invariably implicitly or explicitly favors acquittal. 139 
Until recently various rules and attitudes made rape an extremely 
difficult crime to prosecute. The issue of chastity, or virginity, was 
one such barrier. Chastity was legally relevant in rape cases for three 
reasons. First, in many jurisdictions it was an element of the crime 
of statutory rape that the victim be chaste. 140 Second, in most 
jurisdictions the chastity of the rape complainant was considered pro­
bative on the issue of consent, the assumption being that a sexually 
experienced woman was likely to have consented to this particular 
act of intercourse regardless of her words or actions to the 
contrary.141 Third, evidence as to a rape complainant's chastity was 
thought to bear on the woman's general character, and, hence, on 
her credibility. A woman's propensity for falsehood was assumed 
to increase proportionately to her sexual experience. 142 
The concept of chastity was not race-neutral. 143 According to 
governing sterotypes, chastity could not be possessed by Black 
women. 144 Thus, Black women's rape charges were automatically 
137 See Reynolds, supra note 31, at 20-21. 
138 It should be noted that lynching played a strikingly minor role in legal literature, as did 
rape, until recently. The INDEX TO LEGAL PE.ruODICAJ.S lists a total of 39 entries for lynching 
between 1791 and 1949 (the last year containing an entry on lynching). During the same time 
period there were 53 entries for rape. By comparison, there were 775 entries under murder 
and homicide during those years. From 1949 untill970 there were 51 articles about rape com­
pared to 511 about murder or homicide. Between 1970 and February 1982 there were 187 articles 
about rape and 362 about murder/homicide. 
139 Rife, Scientific Evidence in Rape Cases, 31 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 232 (1940) is 
an exception. Recognizing the difficulties in proving rape, Rife details methods of obtaining 
evidence to corroborate victims' testimony. 
140 JURORS, supra note 16, at 168. For a discussion of statutory rape roughly contem­
poraneous with the Patterson decision, see Comment, Criminal Law: Rape 19 KY. L.J. 339 
(1931). See generally, Note, Statutory Rape: Previous Chaste Character in Florida, 13 U. FLA. 
L. REv. 201 (1960); Note, Statutory Rape-Previous Chaste Character, 57 W.VA. L. REV. 
199 (1955); Comment, Recent Decisions-Criminal Law-No Defense To Statutory Rape That 
Victim Is Married Woman Below The Age Of Consent, 21 MD. L. REv. 84 (1961). 
141 See, e.g., Evidence-Specific Acts of Unchastity by Prosecutrix, 14 GA. B.J. 362 (1953). 
For a detailed and critical discussion, see Berger, supra note 17, at 15-22; see also J. BARXAS, 
supra note 135, at 104; Holmstrom & Burgess, Rape: The Victim Goes on Trial in VtCTJMOLOGY 
III, supra note 116, at 37-38; Note, supra note 17, at 338; Comment, The Rape Victim, supra 
note 103, at 41; Comment, supra note 2, at 935, 938. 
142 Berger, supra note 17, at 16; Note, supra note 17, at 335; Comment, supra note 2, at 
931; Comment, The Rape Victim, supra note 103, at 39, 40. 
143 See supra text accompanying notes 109-112. 
144 See supra note 103. 
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discounted, and the issue of chastity was contested only in cases where 
the rape complainant was a white woman. 
For white women, evidence of unchastity was given less weight 
when the defendant was Black.145 A blatant example of the courts' 
willingness to ignore victims' lack of chastity appeared in the Scotts­
boro opinions. The Alabama Supreme Court demonstrated its deter­
mination to affirm the defendants' convictions by its vigorous pro­
tection of the reputation and credibility of the white woman who 
claimed she was raped. It ruled that evidence pertaining to her marital 
status,146 her previous chastity/47 and her general reputation148 had 
been properly excluded as irrelevant. 
A less famous but equally vivid case also illustrates this dynamic. 
In Story v. State, 149 where a Black man was charged with the rape 
of a white prostitute, the Court found that her unchastity with white 
men was not relevant to her unchastity with Black men, commenting 
that: "The consensus of public opinion, unrestricted to either race, 
is that a white woman prostitute is yet, though lost of virtue, above 
the even greater sacrifice of the voluntary submission of her person 
· to the embraces of the other race." 150 
These rulings shielding the victim's reputation were contrary to tbe 
weight of authority at that time. 151 Indeed, the debate in the legal 
literature prior to the 1970s concerned not whether evidence of the 
complainant's sexual history should be admissible, but rather the type 
of evidence that should be admissible-specific sexual acts or only 
the victim's general reputation. 152 
Many feminists favor excluding evidence of the rape complainant's 
sexual history because the admission of such evidence reflects and 
t•s In the 19th century, evidence of a white woman's lack of chastity sometimes convinced 
courts to treat Black defendants with relative leniency. See, e.g., Cato, a slave, v. State, 9 
Fla. 163 (1860) (rape conviction of slave based on partly contradicted testimony of white pros­
titute set aside and new trial granted). But see Barnett v. State, 83 Ala. 40, 3 So. 612 (1888) 
(rape conviction of Black defendant on uncorroborated testimony of white prostitute upheld). 
1~ Weems v. State, 224 Ala. 524, 521, 141 So. 215, 217 (1932). 
,., Patterson v. State, 224 Ala. 531, 536, 141 So. 195, 197 (1932). 
'"Powell v. State, 224 Ala. 540, 550-51, 141 So. 201, 210 (1932). 
,., 178 Ala. 98, 59 So. 480 (1912). 
1~ Id. at 104, 59 So. at 482. 
m 1 WIGKORE, EVIDENCE § 200 (2d ed. 1923). 
152 See Recent cases-Evidence-Admissability of Prior Acts of Unchastity Upon Issue of 
Consent of Prosecutrix in a Rape Prosecution, 9 TEx. L. REv. 98 (1930). The author argued 
that the better practice was to admit evidence of prior acts rather than general reputation "in 
view of the gross injustice which might result from placing an innocent man at the mercy of 
a lewd and unscrtJpulous woman." See Cross-examination of Prosecutrix in Rape Prosecution, 
l9·GA. B.J. 95 (1956); 14 GA. B.J., supra note 141. 
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reinforces misogynistic views of womenu3 and allows defendants to 
discredit easily the victim's testimony. 154 Yet, in the Scottsboro con­
text, other considerations are also important. The complainant was 
allowed to testify without being cross-examined as to her sexual 
history only because the defendants were Black. Had they been white, 
such evidence would have been admitted, the reputation of the witness 
discredited, and the defendants probably freed. 155 
Another barrier to successful rape prosecutions has been the 
statutory requirements that the testimony of a rape complainant be 
corroborated by other evidence. 156 The corroboration requirement 
was introduced "for the purpose of protecting against false 
accusations."157 To justify the stricter standards of proof required 
in rape cases than for other crimes, commentators claimed women 
153 These include stereotypes that women are especially likely to lie and to be deluded, see 
supra note 142; that sexually experienced women are likely to have actually consented to sex 
with the man they now are accusing, see Note, supra note 17, at 41; Comment, supra note 
2, at 932; Comment, The Rape Victim, supra note 103, at 41; that sexually experienced women 
are apt to lie, see Berger, supra note 17, at 16; Note, supra note 17, at 345; and that sexually 
experienced women cannot be raped, Comment, supra note 103, at 44. 
154 See infra text accompanying notes 209-210. 
m Susan Browruniller notes sexist attitudes manifested in the case, since the white women 
were threatened with vagrancy and prostitution charges, S. BllOWNMILLER, supra note 13, at 
257-58, and since defense counsel tried to destroy the complainant's credibility by claiming 
she was a prostitute, id. at 254. Brownmiller's discussion of the cases is misleading and disturb­
ing because of its singleminded focus on sexism with its attendant sympathy for the white 
women, its belittlement of racism, and its lack of sympathy for the Black defendants sen­
tenced to death. Her distortions are well discussed in A. EDWARDS, RAPE, RAciSM AND mE 
WHITE WoMEN's MoVEMENT: AN .ANSWEJt TO SuSAN l!!ROWNMILLER, 8-15 (2d printing 1979) 
and A. DAVIS, supra note 73, at 198-99. Although Brownmiller is correct that white women 
were under pressure to cry rape because they were often stigmatized or ostracized if they were 
discovered in a voluntary relationship with a Black man, A. RoSE, supra note 26, at 305, these 
hardships on women do not justify false rape charges. Susan Griffin claims, without citation, 
that if a white woman discovered with a Black man did not cry rape, "she herself would be 
subject to lynching." S. GRIFFIN, supra note 103, at 18. This is refuted by the NAACP study 
cited supra at note 28, that found that only 16 out of the 4951 people lynched between 1882 
and 1927 were white women. (The reasons for the lynchings were not given.) The number 
is so small that it is highly unlikely that lynching could have posed a meaningful threat to 
white women who refused to claim that seXual contact with Black men was rape. 
m See, e.g., Comment, Corroborating Charges of Rape, 67 Coum. L. REV. 1137 (1967); 
Comment, Nebraska's Corroboration Rule, 54 NEB. L. REV. 93 (1975); Comment, The 
Corroboration Rule and Crimes Accompanying a Rape, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 458 (1970); Criminal 
Law-Attempted Rape-Merger and Corroboration, 14 BROOKLYN L. REV. 122 (1948); Recent 
Criminal Cases-Rape-Corroboration of Prosecutrix, 26 J. CRJM. L. & CRn.nNoLOOV 463 
(1935-36); Recent cases, 18 OR. L. REV. 264 (1939). 
157 26 J. CRJM. L. & CRIMINoLOGY, supra note 156, at 463. It was incorrectly thought that 
the number of reported rapes exceeded the number of actual rapes due to false accusations 
brought by deluded or malicious women. ~e Comment, supra note 2, 919, 931; infra note 
158. It is now well known that rape is underreported, see supra note 2. The justifications for 
the corroboration requirement became more complex, far-fetched, and misogynist in the late 
1960s, apparently through the influence of Freudian psychology, seeS. BROWNMIU.ER, supra 
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frequently made malicious rape charges and easily duped juries into 
awarding convictions. 158 
One result of the chastity and corroboration rules was that rape 
was often a very difficult crime to prove. 159 Rapes where the woman 
made her report too soon or not soon enough, 160 rapes where the 
woman knew her assailant, 161 rapes where the woman did not resist 
enough, 162 rapes where the woman was sexually experienced, 163 were 
all difficult to prosecute successfully. 
The attitudes manifested in the rape laws and expressed in the legal 
literature extend to other areas of the criminal justice system. Police 
have often been extremely insensitive to rape victims.164 Rape com-
note 13, at 415-20; Berger, supra note 17, at 28. For example, a 1970 comment claimed that 
"[w]omen often falsely accuse men of sexual attacks to extort money, to force marriage, to 
satisfy a childish desire for notoriety, or ~o attain personal revenge. Their motives include 
hatred, a sense of shame after consenting to illicit intercourse, especially when pregnancy results, 
and delusion." Comment, 118 U. PA. L. REv., supra note 156, at 460; see Comment, 67 CoL­
UM. L. REv., supra note 156, at 1138-39. 
158 See, e.g., Note, Criminal Law-Rape-Evidence-Corroboration of Female­
Pregnancy, 13 NEB. L. BULL. 184, 185 (1934-35) ("Because of the difficulty of refuting the 
testimony of the prosecutrix, because of the tendency of juries to convict without weighing 
carefully the evidence, and further, because the crime is one which is often maliciously pros­
ecuted"). A 1967 commentator stressed the "inordinate danger that innocent men will be con­
victed." Comment, 67 CoLUM. L. REv., supra note 156, at 1137. For a more thorough discus­
sion of this notion see Berger, supra note 17, at 22. Feminist writers had responded that the 
conviction rate for rape was actually extremely low. See Note, supra note 17, at 338; Com­
ment, supra note 2, at 931, 935; see also infra note 187. 
159 JURORS, supra note 16, at 100-01; Berger, supra note 17, at 29-32; Comment, The Rape 
Victim, supra note 103, at 38-40. 
160 Holmstrom & Burgess, supra note 141, at 41, report that a victim must make a "fresh 
complaint" but if she does it is assumed by the police that she reported promptly merely in 
order to get back in her husband's or boyfriend's good graces, not because the claim is real. 
161 See Note, supra note 17, at 343-45; Comment, The Rape Victim, supra note 103, at 41. 
The incidence of illegal rape by acquaintances is high; in victim survey data for 1973-1976, 
approximately half the sexual assaults were by men their victims knew; Bowker, supra note 
2, at 166, 169. 
162 The resistance requirements for rape are an excellent example of the ways that the legal 
system fails to protect women from rape. On the one hand, modem rape statutes require that 
the victim's resistance be overcome by force or by violence or by threats of imminent bodily 
harm. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW§ 130.00(8) (McKinney Supp. 1981); WASH. REV. ConE 
ANN. § 9A. 44.010(5) (West Supp. 1981). On the other hand, rape victims who do resist are 
more likely to be seriously injured than are victims who do not. See NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR 
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRlMINAL JUSTICE, LEAA, FORCIBLE RAPE: FINAL PROJECT REPORT 
(1978) cited in Field, Rape, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE (S. Kadish ed. forthcom­
ing 1983); Black Offender, supra note 122, at 134; Note, supra note 17, at 345-47. 
163 See infra text accompanying notes 209-210. 
164 S. BROWNMILLER, supra note 13, at 408; S. GRIFFIN, supra note 103, at 13-14; Note, 
supra note 17, at 348; see York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 
939 (1964). Traditionally police were trained to expect that rape was one of the most falsely 
reported crimes. G. PAYTON, PATROL PROCEDURE 283 (1967), cited in Comment, supra note 
117, at 277 n.6. Several recent studies claim that police have become more sensitive. See, e.g., 
THE VICTIM OF RAPE, supra note 103, at 38-41; W. SANDERS, RAPE AND WOMAN'S IDENTITY 
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plainants have been disbelieved by police more frequently than 
complainants of other crimes. 165 
Women's Actual Experiences 
While denial of any experience is a significant indication of 
powerlessness, the widespread denial of women's experiences of 
coerced sex is the denial of a phenomenon which deeply affects every 
woman's life. 
The crime of illegal rape is a terrifying, traumatic experience which 
often has long-term damaging effects on its victims. 166 Illegal rape 
is much more widespread than is reported to police. A recent study 
concluded that twenty to thirty percent of girls currently aged twelve 
will suffer a sexual attack during their lifetimes. 167 A recent random 
survey of San Francisco households revealed that forty-four to forty­
six percent of women in that city had been victims of rape or at­
tempted rape. 168 
Additionally, the fear and threat of rape influences many women 
who are never actually raped. 169 It restricts movement and forces 
82 (1980). The accounts of negative treatment experienced by many women become notorious 
and thus have a disproportionately large impact on victims' reluctance to report and on the 
image of the police, THE VICTIM OF RAPE, supra note 103, at 53-55. These studies do not 
indicate whether police sensitivity towards women of color has increased; see supra note 122. 
165 In one study, the "unfounding" determination by the pol\ce for forcible rape was 18%, 
while for larceny it was only two percent. G. NETTLER, EXPLAINING CRIME 45 (1974), cited 
in Robin, Forcible Rape: Institutionalized Sexism in the Criminal Justice System in TliE 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND WOMEN, supra note 118, at 246. 
166 See J. BARKAs, supra note 135, 107-29; S. BROWNMILLER, supra note 13, 404-07; E. 
HILBERMAN, TliE RAPE VICTIM 17-19, 33-40 (1976); T. McCAHtLL, L. MEYER C< A. FISCHMAN, 
THE AFTERMATH OF RAPE (1979); THE VICTn.! OF RAPE, supra note 103; Burgess & Holmstrom, 
Rape Trauma Syndrome, in FoRCIBLE RAPE, supra note 2 at 315 [hereinafter cited as Rape 
Trauma]; Note, supra note 17. 
167 Johnson, supra note 122, at 145. 
168 Russell & Howell, Revisions/Reports: The Prevalence of Rape in the United States 
Revisited, 8 SIGNS (forthcoming Summer 1983). The researchers concluded that there is a 260Jo 
probability that a woman will be a victim of a completed rape at some point in her lifetime, 
and that there is a 46% probability that a woman will be a victim of a completed or attempted 
rape at some point in her life, see Russell, Sexual Assault: The Prevalence and Incidence of 
Forcible Rape and Attempted Rape of Females, 7 VICTIMOLOOY (forthcoming 1983). 
169 
"I have never been free of the fear of rape. From a very early age I, like most women, 
have thought of rape as part of my natural environment-something to be feared and prayed 
against like fire or lightning." S. GRIFFIN, supra note 103, at 3; seeS. BROWNMILLER, supra 
note 13, at 449; Riger, Gordon & LeBailly, Women's Fear of Crime: From Blaming to Restrict­
ing the Victim, 3 VICTIMOLOOY 274, 278-80 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Women's Fear of Crime]. 
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women to maintain a special wariness about the situations in which 
they place themselves. 170 
Illegal rape is neither the only nor necessarily the most harmful 
kind of coerced sex for women. 171 Although the definition of rape 
has been expanded in many statutes, 172 the requirement of penetra­
tion remains in some states.173 Spousal rape is legal in most states, 174 
and its incidence is widespread. 175 Other forms of sexual coercion 
are also pervasive. The incidence of incest is difficult to calculate, 
but it is certainly widespread; whatever the exact incidence, there is 
unanimity among researchers that the victims are overwhelmingly 
female, the perpetrators male. 176 A large proportion of working 
170 A recent study found that women feared crime more than men, and that their greater 
fear was rooted in a fear of rape. 93% of women expressed fear of the thought of rape. The 
major practical effect on women of the fear of rape is a restriction of freedom of action. 
Women's Fear of Crime, supra note 169, at 282-83. The researchers concluded: "The effect 
of women's greater fear of crime is to produce social constraints upon them; women not heeding 
those constraints may be punished not only by direct victimization, but also by being blamed 
for their own victimization. The irony of course, is that these restrictions do not guarantee 
that safety." Id. at 282-83; see Reynolds, Rape as Social Control, 8 CATALYST 62 {Winter 1974). 
171 An essential element of the traditional common-law definition of rape is sexual inter­
course including penetration by the penis, seeS. BROWNMILLER, supra note 13, at 424-25; 
L. CLARK & D. LEWIS, supra note 81, at 130-32, 160; Bienen, supra note 8, at 174-75; 
MacKinnon, supra note 2, at 15-16; Comment, supra note 2, at 83. Ignored by such a defini­
tion are forced oral sex, fondling, and penetration with an object, for example. 
172 E.g., acts other than sexual intercourse, N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 2C:14-1 (West Supp. 1982); 
sexual assaults with an object, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-22-2 (Supp. 1982}. 
173 E.g., IDAHO CoDE 18-6101, 6103 (1979); M1ssouru REv. STAT. § 566.040 (1979). 
174 The spousal rape exemption has been abolished in only three states (New Jersey, 
Nebraska, Oregon). JURoRS, supra note 16, at 196. All other states retain some version of 
it, based on a notion that the decision to marry implies continual consent to sexual intercourse. 
Id. at 165. The exemption originated in a conception of the wife as the sexual property of 
the husband. Lord Hale explained, "[The] husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by 
himself upon his lawful wife, for by their mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife 
hath given up herself in this kind into her husband, which she cannot retract," Bien en, supra 
note 8, at 184, quoting M. HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 629 (S. Emlyn 
ed. 1778). 
m The incidence of spousal rape is difficult to estimate, partly because it is legal in most 
states. JURORS, supra note 16, at 163-66; see note 174. However, estimates of wife-battering 
run as high as 50o/o of marriages, R. LANGLEY & R. LEVY, wn:E BEATING 4 (1977); and most 
battered wives are apparently also victims of rape by their husbands, S. ScHECTER, WoMEN 
AND MALE VIOLENCE: THE VISIONS AND STRUGGLES OF THE BATTERED WOMEN'S MoVEMENT 
17, 223 (1982); L. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 108 (1979). 
176 One estimate is that at least 200,000 girls a year are sexually molested, overwhelmingly 
by men. L. SANFORD, THE SILENT Clm.DREN: A PARENT'S GUIDE TO THE PREVENTION OF CHILD 
ABUSE 83 (1980). Another source estimates the number of incest victims at one million a year. 
F. RusH, THE BEST KEPT SECRET: THE SEXUAL ABusE OF Clm.DREN, 2, 4-5 (1980). An estimate 
by the Children's Division of the American Humane Association is that a minimum of 80,000 
to 100,000 children are sexually molested each year. The pattern appears to be 97% male 
offenders, 92% female victims. In the majority of the cases the molester is well-known to 
the child; in one quarter, the molester is a relative. The Humane Association's figures were 
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women are sexually harassed on the job.177 Women also face 
harassment on the street. 178 
Very little is done about these forms of sexual abuse, and what 
has been done has largely been done by women themselves, in the 
last decade. 179 Widespread societal ignorance and general denial of 
sexual coercion by the legal system persist. 180 
Conclusion 
The legal system's treatment of rape is not designed to protect 
women from sexual coercion. Through discriminatory punishment, 
the language of opinions, scholarly writing, and the manipulation 
of doctrine, the legal system has implicitly defined rape so as to limit 
it to the rape of white women by Black men. The social meaning 
of rape is thus limited to a Black offender and white victim. In addi­
tion, because of the legal system's traditionally narrow definition of 
rape, coupled with the widespread acceptance of other forms of sexual 
. coercion, the legal system has also implied that illegal rape is the only 
form of sexual abuse. In fact, both of these implications are false. 
The great majority of rapes of white women are committed by white 
men; and women are subjected to a range of sexual coercion in 
. . 
addition to illegal rape. 
Because of the specific social meaning of rape, sole responsibility 
for the coerced sex of white women has been placed on the shoulders 
of Black men, ~d Black women have been ignored as rape victims. 
based on poor and disorganized families who came to the attention of social service agencies. 
Most incest, however, probably occurs in intact families which escape Social service agencies' 
attention; thus the actual incest incidence is probably much higher. Herman & Hirschman, 
Father-Daughter Incest, 2 SIGNS 735, 736 (1977); seeS. BROWNMillER, supra note 13, at 307-12. 
For personal analyses, see VOICES IN THE NIGHT: WoMEN SPEAKING ABoUT INt:EST (T. McNaron 
& Y. Morgan eds. 1982); and Cottom, Resistance to Incestuous Assault, in FIGHT BACK126-27 
(F. Delacoste & F. Newman eds. 1981). 
177 C. MAcKINNoN, supra note 124, at 26-55. 
178 Despite its ubiquitousness, very little has been published concerning street harassment. 
See L. WALKER, supra note 175, 107-08; Benard & Schlaffer, The Man in the Street: Why 
He Harasses, Ms., May 1981, at 18; di Leonardo, Political Economy of Street Harassment, 
AEGIS, Summer 1981, at 51-56. 
179 See, e.g., FIGHT BAcK!, supra note 176. 
•ro The problems of sexual harassment, incest, and spousal abuse have received very little 
attention and action until very recently. For examples of recent discussions of these prob­
lems, see C. MAcKINNoN, supra note 124 at 158-74 (1979) (sexual harassment); F. RuSH, supra 
note 176, at 137-38 (incest); L. WALKER, supra note 175, at 212-13 (spousal abuse). 
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Those who work against rape and other forms of sexual coercion 
must be vigilant not to support this racist social meaning. Activists 
must realize that the false image of rape sustained by the legal system 
fosters fear and resentment between white women and Black people. 
It is not true that efforts to fight racist abuses of rape charges 
necessarily deny the reality of women's experiences of sexual coer­
cion. Nor is it correct that efforts to fight sexist denials of women's 
experiences of sexual coercion necessarily deny the reality of racist 
abuses of rape charges. 
PART IV: RECASTING THE FORM OF THE 
DEBATE-BEYOND LEGAL REFORM 
The Master's Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master's House 
- AUDRE LORDE'8' 
The pervasiveness of racism and its historical connection to rape 
raise complex issues for those who oppose sexual coercion. As leaders_. _ 
of the movement against rape, 182 feminists are responsible for ex­
amining closely the implications of their actions and proposals. 183 
The foregoing analysis raises considerations often neglected in 
feminist writing184 and thus leads to some conclusions about 
strategies to fight sexual coercion that differ in emphasis from other 
feminist work. 
181 Lorde, The Masters Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master's House, in THIS BRIDGE 
CALLED MY BACK 98 {C. Moraga & G. Anzaldua eds. 1981). 
182 See Rose, Rape as a Social Problem: A By-Product of the Feminist Movement 15 Soc. 
PROBS. 75, 75-77 {1977). 
183 Various commentators have noted that white feminists often demonstrate ignorance of 
the racist uses of the rape charge, and have pointed out the limitations of anti-rape theories 
and strategies that fail to deal with issues of racism. See, e.g., A. DAVIS, supra note 73, at 
178-82, 196-99; A. EDWARDS, supra note 155; THE RACIST USE OF RAPE AND THE RAPE CHARGE, 
supra note 73; Braden, supra note 73; Does the Women's Movement Compromise the Strnggle 
of Minorities? 4 WoMEN's RTs. L. REP. 27, 31 {1977); Friedman, Rape, Racism and Reality, 
AEGIS, Summer 1981, at 14; Hare, Revolution Without A Revolution: The Psychology of Sex 
and Race 13, THE BLACK ScHOLAR, Summer 1982, at 14; Sagarin, supra note 135, at 146; 
Sands, supra note 75. 
184 A fairly common analogy in feminist literature is between lynching and rape. S. 
BROWNMILLER, supra note 13, at 281 ("Rape is to women what lynching was to blacks: the 
ultimate physical threat by which all men keep all women in a state of psychological intimida­
tion."); D. RUSSELL, THE POLITICS OF RAPE 231 {1974) ("Just as lynching may be seen as the 
supreme political act of whites against blacks, so rape may be seen as the supreme political 
act of men against women."); Karmen, supra note 118, at 196 {"Rapes serve, as other crimes 
against women, to remind them of their 'appropriate' place in society- beneath men, just as 
the lynchings of blacks by whites in the south carried the message-accept your lot in life-
HeinOnline -- 6 Harv. Women’s L. J.  133 1983
134 Harvard Women's Law Journal [Vol. 6 
The legal system has historically ignored or denied the claims of 
women who have been victims of rape.185 At the same time, women 
have been traumatized by the criminal justice system, 186 few men 
have been convicted of rape, 187 and women continue to be victim­
ized by rape in appalling numbers.188 
Feminist strategies to combat rape have included encouraging self­
defense and protection, 189 improving the treatment rape victims 
receive after their attack, 190 and reforming rape laws so as to 
increase the conviction rate. 191 
Improving the Treatment of Rape Victims 
One of the most degrading aspects of rape for victims has been 
the treatment they receive from the criminal justice system.192 One 
don't step out of line."); MacMillan & Klein, F AAR Editorial, AEGIS, Summer 1981, at 5 ("Rape 
is a mechanism used to terrorize and subjugate women in much the same way that lynching 
has been used against blacks."). 
This comparison between the functions of rape and lynching is problematic in several respects. 
First, it suggests that it is simple to compare racism and sexism, and in fact implies that they 
function in the same way. Actually, the two operate in complex and different, but related 
ways, as this Note demonstrates. Second, the comparison in itself is ill-chosen. Rapes rarely 
end in murder while lynchings by definition are murder, so from the potential \ictim's perspec­
tive, the terror created by the threats of lynching and rape must be different. Third, the com­
parison ignores the fact that the usual excuse for lynching Black men was actually the rape 
of white women, so that to glibly compare the two is insensitive at best. 
Certain aspects of lynching and rape may be meaningfully analogous. For example, the 
fact that lynching was illegal but socially acceptable, Reynolds, supra note 170, at 64, is also 
true of rape. Also, the seemingly random nature of both crimes and the attendant fear and 
denial by potential victims that the randomness makes possible may make them comparable 
in that respect. But much more historical analysis is needed before such parallels can be con­
structively drawn. Works that begin this process include Aptheker, Woman Suffrage and the 
Crusade Against Lynching 1890-1920, in WoMAN's LEGACY 53 (1982); Hall, supra note 30. 
185 See Parts II and III, supra text accompanying notes 84-180. 
1 ~ See supra notes 164, 192 and accompanying text. 
187 NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AND C!uMJNAL JUSTICE, LEAA, FORCIBLE 
RAPE: FINAL PROJECT REPORT (1978) (one in 50 chance that a conviction will result if the rape 
is reported). 
183 See supra note 168. 
189 D. R;JSSELL, supra note 184, at 284-86; Note, supra note 17, at 352. The philosophy 
and implications of the women's self-defense movement are beyond the scope of this Note; 
for a discussion of the movement, see Telsey, Karate and the Feminist Resistance Movement 
in FIGHT BAcK!, supra note 176, at 184; see also James, Dolt Yourself Self-Defense in id. 
at 201; and Telsey, Some Facts on Self-Defense in id. at 197. 
190 See THE VICTIM OF RAPE, supra note 103, at 264-65; D. RussELL, supra note 184, at 
287-88; Bienen, supra note 8, at 171; Rose, supra note 182, at 75-76; Note, supra note 17, 
at 351-54. 
191 SeeS. BROWNMILLER, supra note 13, at 436; J. MARsH, A. GEIST & N. CAPLAN, RAPE 
AND THE LIMITS OF LAw REFORM 22-23 (1982) [hereinafter cited as RAPE AND THE LIMITS OF 
LAw REFoRM]; BIENEN, supra note 8, at 171; Comment, The Rape Victim, supra note 103, at 54. 
192 SeeS. BROWNMILLER, supra note 13, at 408-10; THE VICTIM OF RAPE, supra note 103, 
at 1-4; Berger, supra note 17, at 23-24; Note, supra note 17, at 347-51. 
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of the critical contributions of feminist anti-rape work has been to 
increase public awareness of this unsympathetic treatment. One pro­
posal to improve the treatment rape victims receive has been to 
increase the representation of women who deal with rape victims 
within the criminal justice system. 193 A second proposal has been to 
exclude evidence of a complainant's prior sexual experiences at 
trial. 194 • 
The first proposal is a positive one as far as it goes, but placing 
more women in law enforcement is not in itself adequate to improve 
the treatment victims receive. If the women participants are all white, 
or have little understanding of racism, many of the problems pointed 
out in this Note will remain. 195 Black women's rape claims will con­
tinue to lack credibility because white women share with white men 
notions of Black people's promiscuity and untrustworthiness. 196 The 
special harshness reserved for Black men who are accused of raping 
white women will also continue. 197 
193 SeeS. BROWNMILLER, supra note 13, at 434-37; Note, supra note 17, at 352. 
194 See RAPE AND THE LIMITS OF LAW REFORM, supra note 191, at 22-23: THE VICTIM OF 
RAPE, supra note 103, at 279; Rose, supra note 182, at 80; Note, supra note 17, at 353. 
195 Howard, Battered and Raped: The Physical/Sexual Abuse of Women, in FIGHT BACK!, 
supra note 176, at 80-81. · 
196 See THIS BRIDGE CALLED MY BACK, supra note 181 (especially pp. 61-101 including And 
When You Leave, Take Your Pictures With You). See generally ToP RANKING (J. Gibbs & 
S. Bennett eds. 1980) (especially Cornwall, Notes From a Third World Woman 61; Gwendolyn, 
Righteous Anger in Three Parts: Racism in the Lesbian Community-One Black Lesbian's 
Perspective 10; Calderone & Charoula, The Personal is Political Revisited: An Exploration 
of Racism in the Lesbian Community 79); Bethel, What chou mean we, white girl? 86 CoNDI­
TIONS: FIVE, Autumn 1979 (The Black Women's Issue); Smith, supra note 87. 
197 Both men and women were included in the studies of beliefs about rape, supra note 71, 
which showed that most people incorrectly believed the most common racial combination in 
rape cases was Black offender/white victim. Similarly, the study of white jurors which showed 
that the heaviest sentences were given to Black men accused of raping white women, supra 
note 67, was based on a sample of both female and male jurors. Many white feminists have 
been reluctant or have refused to support Black men falsely accused of raping white women. 
See Braden, supra note 73; Sands, supra note 75. Angela Davis eloquently exposes the con­
tributions of several white feminists' work to the perpetuation of racism with respect to rape. 
A. DAVIS, supra note 73, 178-82, 198-99. Even more recent writings which have ideological 
roots in feminism contain inaccurate statements which perpetuate racism. A most striking 
example appears in WoMEN AND CRIME IN AMERICA, supra note I. This book, published in 
1981, is intended to fill the need for a text on women in the criminal justice system, id. at v. 
When an interracial rape occurs today, it is most likely to be a black rapist and a white 
victim, which is a reversal of the historical situation that existed in the United States 
during the days of slavery and the decades that followed its termination. During this 
period, it was black women who were constantly in danger of being sexually assaulted 
by white men. 
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If increasing the number of women involved in the legal and 
criminal justice systems is to create a system more sympathetic to 
all women, it is imperative that substantial numbers of these women 
be Black and that all individuals working with rape victims are keenly 
aware of, and strongly opposed to, racism. 198 
Another proposal for improving the legal system's treatment of 
rape victims has been the reform of rape statutes to exclude evidence 
of rape victims' sexual history from trial. 199 Cross-examination on 
the details of one's sexual history, a common defense technique, is 
one of the victim's most traumatic contacts with the legal system.200 
Another rationale for this proposal is that the introduction of the 
rape victim's sexual history as evidence reflects and reinforces 
misogynistic attitudes about women and sexuality. 201 
In Michigan, where the law has forbidden the introduction of 
evidence of past sexual behavior since 1975,2°2 the overall 
experiences of victims, as reported by rape crisis center workers and 
criminal justice participants, seem to have improved markedly.203 It 
does not appear from the Michigan study, however, that attitudes 
about the right of women to be free from sexual coercion have 
changed as a result of the statutory change.204 
/d. at 182. First, this statement is empirically false, as is acknowledged several pages earlier: 
"[Based on the 1975 LEAA crime survey data] Blacks were about as likely to rape whites as 
whites were to rape blacks in the limited proportion of rapes that were interracial." /d. at 
172. Second, even if.it were true that the number of illegal rapes committed by Black men 
against white women outnumbered white rapist/Black victim rapes, the vulnerability of white 
women would not be analogous to the vulnerability of Black women to white masters during 
slavery. To suggest such a comparison is offensive because it denies the seriousness of Black 
women's sexual victimization. See Part II, supra notes 89-124 and accompanying text. In ad­
dition, the analogy resonates with a mythology that defines Black men as rapists of white 
women. See supra note 35. 
198 In one recent study only about three percent of the rape victims commented specifically 
on the sex of the police officers who investigated their cases, although all were male; most 
of the victims' responses about the police were positive, although 10% had serious complaints 
about their treatment by police. THE VIcml oF RAPE, supra note 103, at 51, 53-54. 
199 See supra note 194. 
200 THE VIcmt OF RAPE, supra note 103, at 179-83; Note, supra note 17, at 350-51; 
Comment, The Rape Victim, supra note 103, at 45-46. 
201 See note 153. 
202 Michigan's sexual assault statute, which took effect in 1975, is widely considered one 
of the nation's most innovative and comprehensive rape laws and has served as the model 
for many states. Bienen, supra note 8, at 172. The most detailed published research on the 
impact of rape laws deals with Michigan. See RAPE AND THE Ln.rrrs OF LAw REFoRM, supra 
note 191. For these reasons, the discussion on reforming rape laws is limited to Michigan. 
203 RAPE AND THE Ln.rrrs OF LAW REFORM, supra note 191, at 68-71. 
204 /d. at 106-107. 
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Increasing the Conviction Rate 
Another major goal of feminists has been to increase rape 
convictions.205 Law reform proposals offered to accomplish this 
have included limiting the admissibility of evidence of a victim's sexual 
history,206 reducing the penalties allowed for rape,207 and introduc­
ing degrees of rape. 208 
In Michigan, the conviction rate for sexual assaults has increased 
markedly since the passage of its law making sexual history inad­
missible as evidence and introducing degrees of rape. 209 Apparently 
the increase is largely due to the provision limiting admissibility of 
prior sexual activities.210 
It is understandable that many white feminists initially perceive 
an increased rape conviction rate as a victory. Rape has been denied 
so consistently by the criminal justice system211 until so recently212 
that any type of recognition of it by the legal system seems positive. 
Also, upperclass white women until recently have been fairly isolated 
in a private sphere in which their subordination to men has been fur­
thered by the law's absence, 213 so that the prospect of the law's 
presence in an area, seemingly acting on behalf of women, is 
attractive. 
However, the subordination of other groups has been furthered 
by the law's presence,214 and rape laws in particular have functioned 
:ws See note 191. 
206 RAPE AND THE LIMITS OF LAW REFORM, supra note 191, at 23. 
1111 Many reformers favor reducing penalties for rape because they think the severity of 
traditional penalties deters juries from convicting. Bienen, supra note 8, at 173. 
:ws S. BROWN~>mLER, supra note 13, at 425; Note, supra note 17, at 353. 
209 RAPE AND THE LtMITS OF LAW REFORM, supra note 191, at 29-33, 62. 
210 !d. at 57-62. 
211 See supra text accompanying notes 138-165. 
212 The anti-rape movement began scarcely more than a decade ago, see Rose, supra note 
182, at 76. Susan Griffin's essay Rape: The All-American Crime in RAMPARTS, September 
1971, was one of the first major pieces published. The essay is reprinted in FoRciBLE RAPE, 
supra note 2, at 47. The first law review pieces that had roots in the movement against rape 
also appeared in the early 1970s, e.g., Note, supra note 17; Comment, supra note 2. 
213 See Taub & Schneider, supra note 99, at 117, 121-24. Examples cited by the authors 
include tort law's family immunity provisions, the marital rape exemption, and contract law's 
failure to deal with financial commitments relating to marriage, id. at 121-22. "For example, 
when the police do not respond to a battered woman's call for assistance or when a civil court 
refuses to evict her husband, the woman is relegated to self-help, while the man who beats 
her receives the law's tacit encouragement ..•. By declining to punish a man for inflicting in­
juries on his wife, for example, the law implies she is his property and he is free to control 
her as he sees fit." !d. at 122. 
214 The criminal justice system allows women to be victimized in their homes and actively 
victimizes people of color. A recent survey of seven geographically diverse U.S. cities found 
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to further white supremacy. 215 In light of the racist history sur­
rounding the legal system's treatment of rape, the goal of increasing 
the rape conviction rate must be examined in more detail. 
Working to increase the conviction rate for rape is not necessarily 
a constructive tactic in the struggle against sexual coercion for several 
reasons. First, most pragmatically, raising the conviction rate has 
not been shown to have any impact on the incidence of rape, although 
long-term data are not yet available. 216 Second, given the existing 
disparities in punishments between whites and Blacks, an across-the­
board increase would simply reproduce these disparities.217 Third, 
the increasingly racist political climate, 218 and the Supreme Court's 
destruction of various constitutional procedures to protect 
defendants, 219 ·suggest that the punishment disparities are likely to 
increase. Fourth, to the extent these disparities implicitly indicate that 
men are being punished on racial grounds and not because .they com­
mitted rape, the credibility of the underlying claim of sexual abuse 
is undermined. 22° Fifth, to press for convictions under rape laws 
suggests that women accept the narrow definitions and limited con­
ceptions of sexual abuse that underlie those laws. Finally, to say that 
rape should be treated like other crimes is problematic in that it im­
plicitly validates the way other crimes have been and are treated. The 
criminal justice system has radical shortcomings- the treatment, 221 
that 780Jo of persons fatally shot by police during 1973 and 1974 were Black. C. MILTON, J. 
HAu.EcK, J. LARDNER&: G. ALBRECHT, POLICE USE OF DEADLY FORCE 19, 22 (1975). Black 
women are not immune from police violence. SeeR. KNooHUIZEN, R. FAHEY & D. PALMER, 
THE POLICE AND THEIR USE OF FATAL FORCE IN CHICAGO 20 (1972); Los Angeles Board of 
- Police Commissioners, Concerning the Shooting of Eula Love, reprinted in 14 CRIME & Soc. 
JusT., Winter 1980, at 2. See generally D. BELL, supra note 18; A. L. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra 
note 13; Burns, supra note 8. 
215 See Parts I and II, supra text accompanying notes 1-124. 
216 F ·E AND THE LIMITs OF L.Aw REFoRM, supra note 191, at 27. 
217 See supra note 67. 
218 See Braden, The Ku Klux Klan Mentality-A Threat in the 1980's, 20 FREEDOMWAYS 
7 (1980). 
219 For example, for limitations on federal habeas corpus rights, see Engle v. Isaac, 102 
S. Ct. 1558 (1982}, reh. den., 102 S. Ct. 2286 (1982); Rose v. Lundy, 102 S. Ct. 1198 (1982); 
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977}, reh. den., 434 U.S. 880 (1977); Stone v. Powell, 
428 U.S. 465 (1976}, reh. den., 429 U.S. 874 (1976). 
220 Williams and Holmes claim that "To a great extent, the lack of credibility given the 
charge of rape today is attributable to the interwoven history of rape and racism where all 
involved know from their own experience (whether that of White male oppressor, White female, 
or Black male) that rape has been a technique of social control to maintain the White Patriar­
chy." THE SECOND ASSAULT, supra note 3, at 35. 
221 See Rudovsky, The Criminal Justice System and the Role of the Police, THE POLITICS 
OF LAW, supra note 8, at 242-52. For example, the shooting of civilians by police officers, 
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definition,222 an4 punishment223 of many other crimes should be 
deplored rather than endorsed. It has refused to protect and indeed 
has consistently worked against the interests of Black men, Black 
women, and white women. 224 
The Sanders and Hines cases discussed earlier225 illustrate the 
risks of pressuring the criminal justice system to "do something" about 
specific rapes, especially rapes committed by Black men against white 
women. Rather than leading to apprehension of the actual rapist,226 
such pressure can lead police to scapegoat an innocent Black man. 
This is not to argue that Black men never rape white women; but 
rather that, where such a rape claim is being prosecuted, white 
feminists must not overlook the circumstances surrounding the event 
in order to be certain that the prosecution is not a racial act against 
the wrong man in an attempt to defuse community pressures. 227 
Such prosecutions not only hurt Black people, 228 they also divide 
women along color lines, and do nothing to halt rape. 
Conclusion 
Attempting to reform rape laws to increase convictions thus has 
numerous shortcomings as a feminist strategy. Improving the criminal 
see supra note 214, almost invariably goes unpunished-out of 1500 killings of civilians by 
police from 1960-1970, only three resulted in criminal punishment, according to a study by 
A. Kobler, Police Homicide in a Democracy, 31 J. OF Soc. IssUEs, Winter 1975, at 163-64. 
222 The illegality of consensual sexual acts other than penis-vagina intercourse between 
unmarried persons is an excellent example. See People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y .2d 476 (1980}, cert. 
denied, 101 S. Ct. 2323 (1981) (New York's prohibition against consensual sodomy held 
unconstitutional on privacy and equal protection grounds); Note, The Constitutionality of 
Laws Forbidding Private Homosexual Conduct, 72 MICH. L. REv. 1613 (1974). 
223 Strong evidence suggests that Black defendants generally receive longer sentences than 
do white defendants for most crimes. See JuRORS, supra note 16, at 117; Owens, Looking 
Back Black in BLACKS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 13, 7 at 11. 
224 See Rudovsky, supra note 221, at 244; Taub & Schneide.r, supra note 99, at 117. Janet 
Howard notes that "given the history and nature of the 'justice' system, [using the legal system) 
can only bring small concessions to women's safety, and is more likely to strengthen the 
repressive, racist power of the police, the courts, and the prisons." Howard, supra note 195, 
at 82. 
225 See supra text accompanying notes 74-80. 
226 See Sands, supra note 75. 
227 Sagarin, supra note 135, at 148. 
228 The targetting of Black men for punishment also affects Black women. Alice Walker 
writes, "Whenever interracial rape is mentioned, a black woman's first thought is to protect 
the lives of her brothers, her father, her sons, her lover. A history oflynching has bred this 
in her." A. WALKER, supra note 84, at 93; see A. DAVIS, supra note 73, at 173-74. 
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justice system's treatment of the victim is a positive goal but does 
not change the fact of women's victimization. A problem with both 
approaches is that they only address the problems of women who 
are known victims of illegal rape. This focus is insufficient. First, 
even if the activity forbidden by rape laws stopped, other powerful 
forms of women's sexual subordination would persist. 229 Second, 
given the racist content of the social meaning of rape, struggles limited 
to illegal rape are likely to have the racist repercussion of targeting 
Black men. 230 
A response must be devised which goes beyond the formulation 
of rape as an extraordinary crime to which only some unlucky women 
fall victim, to a conception that the sexual coercion of women is per­
vasive, multivariate, and wholly unacceptable in every form. 231 If 
women go beyond the formulation given by the legal system they 
may be able to escape some of the traps of racism, and claim their 
own lives and sexuality. 
This means linking rape issues with other issues of sexual coer­
cion such as incest,232 spousal abuse, and sexual harassment. It also 
means recognizing that rape will be treated by the criminal justice 
system in a racist way as long as this society is racist. 
CONCLUSION 
. . . Eyes that only see the bruises inflicted by men miss seeing other 
bruises and deep scars. -JANET HowARn233 
The legal system's treatment of rape both has furthered racism and 
has denied the reality of women's sexual subordination. It has 
disproportionately targetted Black men for punishment and made 
Black women both particularly vulnerable and particularly without 
219 See supra notes 171-178 and accompanying text. 
230 See Part I, supra text accompanying notes 1-83. 
231 See supra notes 171-178 and accompanying text; see also Hoagland, Violence, Victim­
ization, Violation, 15 SINISTER WISDOM, Fall 1980, at 70. 
232 Susan Brownmiller observes that "If protection of the bodily integrity of all children 
is to be genuinely reflected in the law, and not simply the protection of patriarchal interests, 
then the current division of offenses (statutory rape for outsiders; incest for a member's fam­
ily) must be erased." S. BROWNMIIJ.ER, supra note 13, at 429. 
233 Howard, supra note 195, at 80. 
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redress. It has denied the reality of women's sexual subordination 
by creating a social meaning of rape which implies that the only type 
of sexual abuse is illegal rape and the only form of illegal rape is 
Black offender/white victim. Because of the interconnectedness of 
rape and racism, successful work against rape and other sexual coer­
cion must deal with racism. Struggles against rape must acknowledge 
the differences among women and the different ways that groups 
other than women are disempowered. In addition, work against rape 
must go beyond the focus on illegal rape to include all forms of 
coerced sex, in order to avoid the racist historical legacy surroun­
ding rape and to combat effectively the subordination of women. 
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